

CRFCA

Council of Reserve Forces'  
and Cadets' Associations

# THE UNITED KINGDOM RESERVE FORCES

EXTERNAL SCRUTINY TEAM

ANNUAL STATUTORY REPORT  
2021



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
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## FOREWORD

1. Last year's report was delayed by three months because of the pandemic, which has made this year's reporting period shorter and more problematic with the ongoing limitations on conducting visits, particularly as there has been limited routine physical training by reservists. But I would like to record our appreciation of the MOD and the three Services who did everything they could do to host us virtually and physically in the latter months, and provide us with all the necessary reports and evidence to complete a report in this extraordinary time.
2. This year our team has been joined by Air Commodore (Retd) Paul O'Neill, who is a great asset having concluded his regular service considering personnel strategy in the RAF. I also am delighted to welcome Professor Gary Sheffield to the team as our academic. He is well known to the military having taught at Sandhurst and on the Higher Command and Staff Courses and is well versed on matters that concern the Reserve having written widely on the two world wars. His thoughts from a historical perspective leading to the use of the Reserve in the future are included at Annex A.
3. We acknowledge that this year's review is more limited than a normal year with a reduced number of recommendations. This was inevitable because of the reduced activity levels but it is certainly an important moment of time in the development of the Reserves and its contribution to Defence capability. The description of a Whole Force, describing the combination of regular and reservists in a single military entity, has been around for well over a decade but at times it has been questionable whether Defence was really committed to this end state. But the conclusion of the recent Integrated Review makes it very clear this is the only way forward not only because of the restraints on the affordability of the regular component but also the acceptance there is much to be gained from greater use of the citizen servicemen & women and their broader, and sometimes unique, specialist skills gained from their civilian qualifications and employment.
4. As we said in last year's report we welcomed the Chief of Defence Staff's instigation of the Reserve Forces 2030 Review (RF30) and the early indications of its ambition. Lord Lancaster's review published in March this year has not disappointed in its breadth and ambition. Its conclusions and recommendations are laudable that if implemented will lead towards a truly integrated and effective Whole Force. It is not a funded programme like the Future Reserve 2020 (FR20) and we would surmise significant investment will need to be made to achieve the intended outcome. But an implementation team has been set up to take forward its recommendations. We look forward to engaging with them and commenting on the progress that is being made.
5. It is an exciting time for reservists and we, like them, look forward to seeing how their individual Service structures and uses their reserves as they take forward the Integrated Review (IR) and we, in particular, positively anticipate the implementation of the RF30 as it breaks down barriers to the routine and consistent use of the Reserve and maximises the benefits the reservists, their employers and wider society can bring.



S F N Lalor  
Major General (Retired)  
June 2021





## INTRODUCTION

1. The Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) Independent Commission identified a requirement for an annual report by an External Scrutiny Team (EST) on the overall state of the Reserve Forces. The first two reports were provided at the request of the Secretary of State (SofS) for Defence in 2013 and 2014. On 1 October 2014, the Reserves Forces' and Cadets' Association (RFCA) had a statutory duty placed on them to report annually to Parliament on the state, and an assessment of the capabilities of the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces (Annex B)<sup>1</sup>. Terms of Reference for the EST is at Annex C. This will be the seventh report under these statutory arrangements.
2. We submitted our last report through the SofS for Defence on 8 October 2020. It was placed in the Library of the House on 11 February 2021. On 30 June we received his response to our report, updating us on progress and commenting on our recommendations (see Annex D).
3. **Methodology.** This year's report covers a much shorter period than normal because of the late delivery of the 2020 Report due to the pandemic and our wish to get back to the usual timing of delivering the report to the SofS as required by the Reserve Forces Act 1996. We had useful visits to the deputy Service Chiefs,<sup>2</sup> Vice Chief of Defence (VCDS), Chief Defence People (CDP) and Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Reserve and Cadets) (ACDS (R&C)) and visited Headquarters and Establishments with Reserve responsibilities, as well as a cross-section of units around the country to understand the situation 'on the ground'. Many were conducted by video conference due to COVID restrictions and suffered from technical glitches, but we were pleased that we were able to get on to the ground in the latter part of the reporting period and meet 'in the flesh'. Understandably, we still were limited by not being able to visit reservists conducting training or on exercise, such as Exercise JOINT WARRIOR.
4. This report is dominated by two themes. Firstly, the effective use of the Reserve on Operation RESCRIPT and other operations in support of the government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, it is shaped by the publication of the Integrated Review (IR) and Reserve Forces 2030 Review (RF30). These documents set a welcome ambition for the Reserve, and describe opportunities for building further on the utility of the Reserve, but have not yet been turned into specific policy. This report will report on how the Reserve's potential, as described in the IR and RF30, might be turned into reality.

## REPORT THEMES

5. Our mandate is to report on the state and capabilities of the Reserve Forces. Last year we noted that, although the strength of the Reserve had much improved, a number of institutional impediments to reserve service remained without change. And, without these impediments being removed, the full value of an integrated Whole Force will not be achieved. It is not altogether surprising that our report picks up on the same themes, or impediments, each year – funding, Terms and Conditions of Service (TACOS), integration, mobilisation as examples – as our mandate remains the same and we focus on the issues that impact significantly on reserve force capability. As before, all previous recommendations are listed at Annex E.

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1. Defence Reform Act, 14 May 2014, Chapter 20 Part 3 Paragraph 47.

2. Second Sea Lord, Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Deputy Commander Capability.

6. We also indicated that the IR and the RF30 would result in significant change and opportunities for Defence and the place of the Reserve to meet the challenges of the future. Those facing the UK in 2020 have proved the value of a trained and committed Reserve. Under Operation RESCRIPT, reservists from all three Services have been deployed in support of the national COVID-19 pandemic response. It also demonstrated again that the reservist volunteer would come forward when required and Defence can be confident this will be the case in the future. The value in such a surge capacity has renewed focus on having such a Reserve, and not only in Defence. In this year's report, as well as our usual commentary, we highlight the conclusions and recommendation of the Defence Command Paper and the RF30 and examine where further work is required to increase the utility and use of the Reserve in order that the outputs, talents and synergies of the Whole Force<sup>3</sup> can be maximised.
7. However, as before, we start with a commentary on workforce strength, because the capability of a force starts with people and units manned to their established strength.

### Reserve Strength

8. The detail of the manning statistics is at Annex F.<sup>4</sup> The targets for trained strength in the three Services remain: Royal Navy (RN) – 3,100; Army – 30,100; Royal Air Force (RAF) – 1,860; totalling 35,060. Although, the overall strength of the Reserve increased by 400 to 37,410 personnel (RN – +200; Army – +100; and RAF – +100), there was a reduction to overall trained strength by -220 to 32,700. The reductions were in the RN (-10) and Army (-360), but the RAF impressively continued to grow their trained strength by +150.
9. The main effort of the Army's Home Command has been on recruiting, particularly for the regular Army, as it had become undermanned. Although this has been a success for the regulars – the recruiting targets have been met in the last two years – it has not been reflected for the Army Reserve where only 78% and 75% of the Reserve recruiting target was met in the last two years. **In a Whole Force, it is disappointing to observe it does not seem possible to maintain a consistent focus on reserve recruiting as well.** Regulars also were given preference over that of reservists for spaces at basic training, which were reduced overall because of the limitations imposed by COVID-19. Furthermore, some Phase 2 courses (initial specialist training) were increased from two weeks to three weeks. **All of this impacted negatively in getting reservists who wish to join through basic training.**
10. We learnt that the main effort of Home Command has been shifted to the 'Lived Experience', perhaps not surprising as regular recruiting targets have been met and the strength of the regular Army is set to reduce from 82,000 to 75,500 by 2025. However, **we would recommend that the same intensity of focus and consistency that led to the success of Army regular recruiting is applied to the Reserve, particularly given that the reductions to regular strength increase the importance of having a fully manned Reserve.** Without this, we assess that reserve manning will get out of balance and therefore need another Operation FORTIFY<sup>5</sup> with an unnecessary additional cost to recover the situation.
11. Given the smaller trained strength targets and increase in untrained strength, recruiting for the RN and RAF should be less of a problem or challenge.

### Defence Reviews

12. We fully support the themes in the Defence Command Paper that *"...the reserve forces will be given new, more clearly defined roles..."* in order that they provide

3. Defence Command Paper 2021, paragraph 6.6.

4. Figures have been rounded to the nearest 10, though numbers ending in '5' have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 20 to prevent systematic bias. Totals and subtotals have been rounded separately and may not equal the sum of their rounded parts.

5. The Army's operation to address Reserve manning during the FR20 programme.

greater capacity and “... an alternative source of diverse talent to conduct operations at home and abroad.” More importantly, we endorse the desire to create “... an efficient and fluid spectrum of military service...” so that the reservist can have a range of commitment options.<sup>6</sup> We also continue to endorse the need to improve the way that reservists are recruited and employed in order to tap into those skills that reside in the civilian and private sector, but are ones that regular forces find difficult to grow and retain. If realised, this should enable “... a more productive integration of the Reserves.”<sup>7</sup>

13. As in previous reports, we have been encouraged by our conversations with senior leaders of the three Services. We were told that their Reserve has become more integrated and integral to delivering the required operational output. The Army and RAF are going further to integrate, understand and utilise the strengths of the Reserve. The RN’s intent is less clear to us. We were told that the requirement should be driven by the Service need but we are concerned that could lead to the feeling of the Reserve being considered purely as a commodity, overlooking the imperative to provide a military environment and community which will both attract and retain individuals with the required skills.
  - a. **Royal Navy.** The RN recognise that in order to maximise synergies of the Whole Force, the Maritime Reserve will be given new, more clearly defined roles. It will continue to focus on auxiliary roles such as those undertaken by the Submarine Warfare, Information Warfare, Engineering and Air Branches and full-time mobilised roles at sea with Offshore Patrol Vessels and 3 Commando Group. **There is the potential for a RN Reserve role in the Type 31 Frigate.** The recently approved Maritime Reserve Directive is to be revised, as part of the wider Navy Command Transformation, and how that describes the ultimate implementation intent, and the RN’s interpretation of the Whole Force concept and the part played by its Reserve, will be critical.
  - b. **Army.** The Army continue to stress the importance of the Reserve and, while it will be integrated fully into the regular structures with a warfighting role, the intention is that it also will **lead on the protection of the homeland and delivering the Army’s contribution to national resilience.** We look forward to seeing the Army’s evolving structure with all reserve units having clearly defined roles and clear purpose.
  - c. **Royal Air Force.** The RAF has ambitious plans for its Reserve, developing as a component of its transformation programme Astra for the Next Generation Air Force of 2040. In this, having exceeded its FR20 trained strength targets, it is **planning to grow the size of the Part-Time Volunteer Reserve to 5,000 over the next 10 years. There is also an ambition to ensure that 10-20% of RAF deployments will comprise reservists, forward deployed and/or in UK-based operational support.** The RAF Reserve value their significant contribution to routine outputs and the opportunity to work alongside their regular colleagues within the UK and overseas. The RAF look to improve career management processes and identify paths for volunteer reservists to earn promotion to both Warrant Officer and Air Vice Marshal.
14. For this ambition to realised, we would reinforce our recommendation of last year **that the Reserve, through embedded part-time reserve staff posts, should be involved in all aspects of the Whole Force across all Defence Lines of Development (DLOD) – particularly force design**

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid and paragraph 7.34.

**and capability development.** It is not that the capabilities of regulars are doubted, but the detailed knowledge of mobilisations and the interaction with reservists, their families and employers is a specialist subject with nuances, advantages and limitations which are not so readily apparent to regulars who have had little previous experience of working with their reserve counterparts. It has been suggested it is not possible to have part time reservists working in dynamic operationally focused functions but we do not accept this as with modern IT and communications, reservists can always be available and able to make an input.

### Reserve Force 2030

15. Last year we welcomed the intent of RF30 and the early indications of its ambition; it must be considered as an opportunity to make real progress in the development and utility of the reserve element of the Whole Force. Perhaps in an ideal world a review would not be required as this progress might have been made by Defence and the three Services through routine development and staff work, but it is appreciated there are always competing priorities. **Thus we understand why the Chief of Defence Staff instigated this review so progress did not cease after the completion of FR20. The challenge now will be translating the good work of this review into real change up to 2030 through determined action and commitment.**
16. We also support any initiative that will assist in unblocking the barriers or impediments, highlighted in paragraph 5 above, as a means to unlock the potential of the Reserve, particularly as many support and reinforce what we have been reporting on since 2013. RF30<sup>8</sup> provides a positive vision for the future of the Reserve that moves beyond FR20 and “... *is designed to inform programmes that are likely to influence the development of the reserves and to initiate new projects where there are gaps.*” Although, it is not costed and remains unfunded and therefore at the moment represents policy guidance rather than a programme, an implementation team has been formed within CDP’s organisation to develop the ideas that will then require approval and resourcing.
17. RF30 describes a conceptual model of three types of Reserve:
  - a. **The Reinforcement Reserve** – reservists that routinely support defence output and activity, more akin to auxiliaries.
  - b. **The Operational Reserve** – reservists who regularly are trained and exercise for contingency tasks – a reserve in the true sense of the word.
  - c. **The Strategic Reserve** – ex-regular and ex-reservists who retain a reserve commitment that can be called up to generate surge capacity in extreme cases of national threat. It was known formerly as the Regular Reserve and as we commented last year, in the past members were called up for a day to register and those that wished to, then could conduct training with Reserve units, but this has not been exercised in recent times.
18. Of the 21 recommendations in RF30, we would highlight the requirement for a budgetary strategy that makes it easier to use the Reserve (B.4) and all the recommendations that would help unlock the potential of the reservists – simplified commitments (C1), a spectrum of service (C2), an agile workforce function (C3) and further develop reserve recruiting (C4). We comment on these more fully below. We believe there is an opportunity for the implementation team to make some quick progress and wins by removing barriers to the use of the Reserve, which will be appreciated by the Services and thus have their support as the review progresses.

8. RF30 report, page 7.

19. We believe that a key role for the EST is to report on the implementation of RF30 and its impact on the capabilities of the Reserve and how it remains consistent with other broader Government and Defence ambition for the Reserve, reflecting the potential contribution of the Reserve as a whole, as well as the individual reservists. Doing so will require other parts of Defence to engage with the RF30 implementation team, notably the capability and finance areas, as well as the single Services.

### Utility of the Reserve

20. The above Reviews all point to a greater use of the Reserve, particularly the Reinforcement Reserve, and therefore a need for a greater utility from this component. RF30 describes the 'offer' in terms of the Defence People Strategy model on the 'Lived Experience' under the headings of Environment, Motivators, Opportunities and Reward. We have said that in order to attract and retain the reservist, all Defence has to do is deliver on the 'offer', which we believe for the Reserve comprises: provision of interesting, challenging and worthwhile training; the opportunity to deploy on operations alongside regular colleagues; the opportunity to have 'fun'; and to feel valued by Defence.<sup>9</sup> We believe that this still holds true and will do so in the future. When met, we have seen well recruited units with high morale. It does create camaraderie and a sense of belonging to a team that has purpose, and most importantly, reservists feel valued and that what they do is worthwhile. Conversely, measures that undermine this feeling of worth have a negative impact much greater than the actual monetary value of the measure itself.
21. In RF30, Brigadier The Rt Hon The Lord Lancaster says that his service life *"... has been part of a fairly consistent juggling act between the competing demands of a hectic professional career, private life and soldering."* This is true for all reservists and will always be the case. However, what would appear to be changing is the demand from the three Services for greater use of the Reserve. Greater frequency and overall number of deployments imply that the Reserve will need to be held at a higher readiness than before. Rather than relying on part-time volunteer service, **an increased Minimum Commitment through service on a contractual basis, for example using the Additional Duties Commitment (ADC) (a binding 'contract' for up to 180 days service in any one year) may have to be made.** This increased force preparedness will also, as the Army has recognised, require a greater level of training with and alongside regulars, all of which will require a commensurate level of funding. The RN and RAF already use elements of their Reserve as auxiliaries in this way to good effect in reinforcing the regulars, albeit with smaller numbers. From our visit to the RN, it would appear that there is strong ambition from senior commanders to broaden the pool of such auxiliary functions using reservists on varying contractual terms to be used as required and to give assurance of availability.
22. Under this model, the key question is whether it is possible to recruit and train the greater numbers envisaged in future in what RF30 terms the Reinforcement element of the Reserve. However, working patterns and expectations are changing and peoples may be prepared to accept, even prefer, a more fluid approach to jobs and careers, being able to dip into one and then another. Members of the Reinforcement Reserve may be part-time workers of their MOD and civilian employers to different degrees – working and being employed at different times by either. This is highlighted in the RF30 Report where three different scenarios are postulated of how a maritime reservist might view the workplace.<sup>10</sup> This approach would fit in with the increasing trend to a portfolio approach to the workplace in future generations. We acknowledge that there may be a different emphasis

9. EST Report 2018.

10. RF30, page 40.

on the means of delivery of the constituent parts of the 'offer', **but more will be expected of reservists and not necessarily at their choice of timing.** We would make the point that no one knows what the employment market will bear in the provision of a larger number of reservists routinely and consistently committing to a large number of days of military service per annum, and any such commitment should be trialled and tested over a number of years before any judgement is made. Conceptually, we believe it is possible as the target working population is large with a myriad of different types of employment and vocations. But, the need for the reservist to feel that what they do is of value and valued remains paramount. We note that a **greater percentage of regulars have a positive opinion of the value and professionalism (high 70s) of the Reserve in 2021 than in 2020,** but, however, the proportion of personnel rating the Reserve as well-integrated remains at only 68%.<sup>11</sup>

23. All three Services undertook in-year savings measures this year that impacted upon the Reserve. Each found it necessary to reduce the Reserve pay budget. The Army and RAF both retained sufficient to enable reservists to achieve their annual certificates of efficiency. The RN chose to stand their reservists down for almost three months. **We believe the RN's arbitrary cutting of Reserve Service Days (RSDs), breaches the implicit contract that the service has with its reservists, and undermines the personal sense of worth and being valued;** we heard that it now was acknowledged as a mistake. Rather like similar cuts by the Army in 2009, there appeared to be little understanding on the impact on their reservists' remuneration expectations and thus their value to their Service. In this particular case, we learned it also impacted on operational output as reservists, working as auxiliaries, particularly in the Engineering and Air Branches were not able to turn up for work. The team understands that the RN was later able to re-direct some funds to enable new-entry training to continue and to reinstate some operational roles, but in our visits we did find that there was a strong residual sense that individual sailors were no longer truly valued. All three Services have used RSDs as an in-year financial regulator in this way in the past. If used again, and we do not advise or support this, we assess the impact would fall proportionately harder on the Operational Reserve or part-time volunteer reserve, as members of the Reinforcement Reserve may well be contracted.
24. We assess that all the changes required can be delivered and is within the gift of the Services and MOD to deliver, but it **will require detailed and long-term planning and proper agreed costing. We would caution against moving too fast as the reservist of today may be different to those required of tomorrow.** As we have reported, a reservist can simply leave if the offer is not met, or the balance between the demands of the civilian employment, domestic life and reserve service are out of kilter and impossible to manage. Since it takes time to recruit and train a reservist to the required standard, the inflow and numbers need to be secured before the outflow begins of those who do not wish for this style of career or the new demands of reserve service. However, we note lateral inflow and making use of specific civilian skills will mitigate this issue.
25. The attitude and support of employers will be key to this development. They have been and continue to be very supportive. The number of companies signing up to **the Armed Forces Covenant (AFC) continues to grow at an average of 25 signings per week, despite the difficulties imposed by COVID-19 lockdown, and now total 6,978** as at the end of May 2021. This number would have been greater but for the COVID-19 pandemic causing a number of businesses to fail. There are also over 100 applications for consideration of the Employer Recognition Scheme (ERS) Gold Award, which currently stand at 354. Employer engagement and support might never be more important.

11. Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey 2021.

### Funding

26. Clausewitz identified the nature of friction and the impact on operations where in principle everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult to carry out. The task for commanders is to identify and eradicate possible sources of friction in order to maintain simplicity. We have consistently commented on one constant source of friction, which has bedevilled how the Reserve is used – funding: how much does the Reserve cost and how should it be funded, particularly when it is used on contingency operations. It is a harsh reality that the Defence annual budget is always under pressure and each Service struggles to maintain the expected annual cash expenditure and, thus, unplanned additional expenditure with greater use of the Reserve is an unwelcome event for the accountants. But under the Whole Force concept, it is axiomatic that the Reserve will be used, indeed has to be used. **To remove this friction, we have recommended since 2014 that the MOD should consider establishing a contingency fund to be available for short notice operations. This was a recommendation of the FR20 Commission.**
27. Rightly in our view, the MOD directed that the Reserve should be part of its contribution to support Government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, but the funding friction remained and served to distract and occupy staff time when it might have been better employed elsewhere. The MOD only claimed 'marginal costs' from Partners Across Government (PAG), which meant that the Services had to meet the full costs from their in-year budgets. We noted that the RN and RAF fund its Reserve from their overall manpower budget. This has worked well under routine conditions, but proved challenging particularly with the greater demand for Operation RESCRIPT. The Army holds a budget for RSDs and mobilisation. The same debate then arose over the merits of using the Reserve, with unbudgeted in-year costs, as against the already sunk cost of the regulars. This was exacerbated as the increased demand and use of the Reserve coincided with a difficult financial year and the need for in-year savings measures. Hence the decision was taken to demobilise reservists in 2020 once the first wave of the pandemic had abated with a consequent reduced demand signal for military support.
28. In January 2021, it was agreed that costs associated with Operation RESCRIPT could be recovered from PAGs. **If this had not happened, we question whether there would have been the same willingness to use the Reserve as the Services were in the throes of finalising in-year saving measures and their end of year spend.** It also was agreed that reservists could be deployed on RSDs for up to 28 days with Ministerial approval. This initiative raised separate issues, which are discussed in greater detail below.
29. In summary, as at May 2020, it was estimated that cost of mobilised reservists was £72m, but this came with a possible unknown variance of +/- 20%. More up-to-date figures were not available at the time of writing. If it is accepted that the Reserve will take part in homeland resilience operations as indicated in the IR and RF30, then we repeat our **recommendation from 2020 that the MOD produces a transparent and agreed costing method across all three Services and, in addition, a contingency fund is identified and ring fenced to allow that use so that this almost perennial debate, or friction, does not arise.**
30. We are pleased to note the RF30 recommendation supporting this critical requirement – *“a budgetary strategy that makes it easier for workforce planners to dynamically flex funding between workforce types and enables more reservists to be mobilised each year.”*<sup>12</sup>

### Mobilisation

31. We commented in detail on the mobilisation process in last year's report and made a number of recommendations. It is clear from our visits to Service Headquarters (HQ) that these have been recognised. One **recommendation that we would continue to emphasise is that embedded part-time reservist posts are built into key HQs** – Security Policy and Operations (SPO) in the MOD, the Land Operations Centre (LOC) and Standing Joint Headquarters (SJC) – in a similar fashion to that which we have recommended in paragraph 14 above. While reservists might not have as a broad view of all military disciplines as their regular counterparts, what they do have is broad knowledge of the reservist and what can or cannot be achieved if they are to be mobilised, as well as to advise how best to manage the interface between Defence, reservists and employers. It was this ingredient that was missing in the early days of Operation RESCRIPT which led to misunderstandings or myths about the Reserve capabilities, and is avoidable in the future.
32. In principle, the process for mobilising reservists for contingent tasks is simple – MOD receives the demand and develops an activation order, the Services trawl for volunteers in what they call Force Sense (FSen) to see if there are suitably qualified reservists that can be used. Services then produce a Force Generation order (FGen) and the reservists deploy. We acknowledge that using reservists does bring a degree of added complication to this process. We observed two Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) loops running. That of the SPO and SJC as they respond to the demand signal of a crisis, often fast moving and subject to change. And that between the SPO and Service HQs as they FSen what reservists might be available, wished to be available and in what time frame. Before committing, the reservists need to consult with their employer and family. In visits to units, we saw that Commanding Officers, through the use of social media groups and QR codes on DefNet, can communicate and get a response very quickly. Nevertheless, it is a fact that once Service HQs have firmed up numbers and started the process of either mobilisation or calling forward reservists on RSDs, the situation (or demand signal) may change. During Operation RESCRIPT, this led to reservists being mobilised, but not tasked, mobilisations being revoked or reservists being stood down early from a task, often at very short notice. We heard of examples of this happening on a Friday afternoon prior to deployment on the following Monday.
33. It has been common practice for the Services to use RSDs to deliver operational output for up to 14 days. RSDs have also been used as a means of deploying reservists on homeland resilience tasks – response to flooding being an example. Experience on Operation RESCRIPT has indicated a trend that this mechanism will be increasingly used in the future and reservists now can be deployed for up to 28 days with Ministerial approval. It is acknowledged that this is a cost effective and flexible option for operational planners and commanders, particularly if costs are met by PAGs. However, it does raise a number of questions.
  - a. **Employer Support.** As part of their Employer Notification process, reservists are expected to have a discussion with their employer over what their 'training year' might look like – annual camp of 14 days, courses etc. In the future, as indicated in paragraph 17 above, this may include weekday training in order to train alongside regular colleagues or paired units. A reservist also has to complete a mandated number of training days and tasks to qualify for their 'Certificate of Efficiency' and

earn the training bonus. Employers increasingly generously give reservists an additional 14 days paid holiday so that attending annual camp does not use up their annual holiday allowance. Greater and additional use of RSDs for Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA) tasks then may compromise training standards if training results in employees having to use their holiday time and employers are unwilling to release their employees later in a year. **We also would like to see greater analysis of the civilian status of reservists and whether they are students, casual labour, self-employed or employees as this must have a bearing on their availability, particularly at short notice.**

- b. **Employee Protections.** Reservists deploying on operations on RSDs do not have the same employee protections, nor does the employer get recompensed to find a short-term replacement as for those being mobilised. In terms of medical support, a reservist injured while training on RSDs will receive a disablement allowance commensurate with their Service rank. A mobilised service person is likely to be kept mobilised until fit. We have advocated that an additional, separate and different mobilisation package was developed for reservists deploying on shorter, less kinetic Defence Activity other than Operations (DAOTO). UK homeland resilience operations also fit into this category. This did not have the support of the three Services, but we heard that there is greater support for 'an enhanced' RSD to resolve these anomalies. **If reservists are to be deployed on operations using RSDs more frequently and as a matter of policy, we recommend that the MOD reinvigorates the work to develop an appropriate package of support.**

### Use of the Reserve

34. In paragraph 13 above, we indicated how the three Services view the integration of the Reserve in the Whole Force. The Services use their Reserve differently. In general terms, the Army Reserve is largely (not exclusively) focused on contingent capability, while the RN and RAF use more of their reservists as reinforcements to routine outputs using RSDs, ADC or Full Time Reserve Service (FTRS) commitments. Despite the numbers deployed on Operation RESCRIPT, there still are opportunities for reservists from all three Services to deploy on overseas operations as the Annex G demonstrates. Of particular note, 6 Rifles took over from 7 Rifles on Operation TOSCA in Cyprus<sup>13</sup> and the Royal Yeomanry have performed strongly on Operation CABRIT.<sup>14</sup>
35. Reservists continue to come forward when asked to take part in Operation RESCRIPT. They want to serve and be used, particularly on homeland resilience operations that impact on their region or locality. **Units and their people want to be seen taking part in operations in their locality**, as much as their community and employers want them to be used. Employers that generously give reservists additional paid holidays to facilitate training then can see the worth of what they have done. We have come across examples of where regular units are drafted into a region to carry out resilience tasks, while local Reserve units effectively stood by and watched. We highlight three examples:
  - a. In South Wales, the ambulance service requested military drivers to support their operations. The local Reserve regiment was ready and capable of immediately providing this support, but stood by and watched another regiment from England deploy into the area, conduct additional driver training and carry out the task.
  - b. In the South West, regular units set up regional testing sites, provided mobile testing units and provide support to the NHS while the local Reserve unit, despite being located very closely, was not used.

13. Op TOSCA is a six month UN operation in Cyprus, normally undertaken by regular units.

14. UK's operation in support of NATO in Poland and the Baltic states.

- c. On a smaller scale, a logistic support/caterer staff officer was requested by the civilian agencies for support to the G7 conference. A reservist was found with all the right skills and, furthermore, was known to and had worked and exercised with all the relevant agencies. But because his 15-day deployment on RSDs attracted an additional cost, a regular was selected.

While, we recognise that the deployment and operational use of units is the Services' business, we comment here because of the wider impact that **such use has on recruiting and retention of reservists and their feeling of worth, and how it runs counter to the Whole Force initiatives articulated by the Services and in the IR and RF30.**

### Terms and Conditions of Service

36. We have commented before on how reservists have been deployed on different TACOS, but on the same task, depending on the Service preference. As a result of the IR and RF30, we were briefed that the Army's Reserve Transformation work has examined the alignment of its vision of an increased role for the Reserve to what is required to deliver it. This includes policy reform to remove barriers, the need for the necessary funding, changes to TACOS and types of commitment. RF30 highlights the eight different varieties of commitment from Part Time Volunteer Reserve service to Full Time Reserve Service.<sup>15</sup> In essence these commitments fit into four categories: part-time volunteer service; part-time contracted service; full-time limited service (constraints on deployment) and full-time full service (or unlimited, no constraints on deployment). Increased use and reliance of the Reserve to support regular forces, whether as part of the Reinforcement, Operational or Strategic Reserve is likely to exacerbate this difference and increase the anomalies between the Service on how they use their Reserve. **We recommend that RF30 takes forward, as a priority, work to simplify the TACOS available and guidelines, or policy (rules) for the appropriate TACOS to meet a given situation; i.e. RSDs for routine training; enhanced RSDs for short operational deployments (maximum 28 days) whether homeland resilience or DAOTO; and full mobilisation for longer deployments and more kinetic operations.**
37. In taking this work forward, we note that while the conceptual clarity of the Reinforcement, Operational and Strategic Reserve is helpful, the language might lead to rigidity into how the three categories might be viewed as distinct elements. If so, this could constrain how TACOS and overall utility are developed given that, in practice, a reservist may contribute to more than one output. For example, those in the Reinforcement Reserve might be used as an Operational Reserve in homeland resilience operations; where do the reservists of units that deploy on operations such as Operation TOSCA sit – Reinforcement or Operational Reserve; an ex-regular with a reserve liability (Strategic Reserve) might also be a volunteer used routinely for their civilian or former military skills (Reinforcement Reserve). Creating discrete Reserve entities could erode the framework's value by confusing roles and the technical arrangements under which individuals are to be employed.

### Frictions

38. Each year we do see how the Services take steps to remove barriers that inhibit Reserve service, particularly over the conduct and delivery of training courses. Nevertheless, we continue to come across instances of such barriers that range from the lack of recognition of civilian qualifications to new processes being implemented as seen through the regular prism, but with little or no recognition of the reservist. The former prove to be particularly irksome as much effort is made by Defence to have military qualifications recognised by the civilian sector.

<sup>15</sup>. RF30 Report, page 58.

39. Although we highlight three examples from the Army and RAF, there will be many others in these two Services, and also the RN.
- a. We came across a Lance Corporal who in his civilian job was a teacher and held a Post Graduate Certificate of Education (PGCE) and was teaching 16 year-olds. However, before being able to instruct military personnel he had to complete a five-day Defence Instructors Techniques course. This is the first in a series of three that allows military personnel to gain the equivalent of a PGCE. Furthermore, despite holding a PGCE, as only Corporals can instruct, he was unable to do so.
  - b. The RAF has introduced a new Human Resources Operating Model (HROM) for its personnel that sees HR staff being removed from their RAuxAF squadrons and HR issues being managed from regional hubs and on-line through an HR portal. This change was developed through the eye of the regular prism, and without due consideration to the unique needs of reservists of all cohorts. The HR Portal App did not incorporate any Reserves-specific HR processes such as Certificate of Efficiency and Annual Training Bounty payment, Attendance Based Pay and mobilisation. Provision of HR support at weekends and the requirement for a MoDNet account to access the HR portal, which not all reservists have, were also not considered. Although, this is being put right, a fully integrated Whole Force approach would have seen the Reserve requirements built in from the start, or, as we emphasised above, the integration of reservists into the various staff structures may have prevented this occurring.
  - c. A Corporal was required to complete the Army Mariner Class 1 Course before he could 'command' a Combat Support boat and/or mexifloat, when a brief familiarisation might have been more appropriate. In his civilian job as a Merchant Naval second officer (the navigator), he holds: an Officer of the Watch (OOW) unlimited certificate, a qualifying degree in Marine Operation, oil and gas industry and Civil Aviation Authority qualifications. He is serving aboard specialised ships providing statutory emergency response capability and logistics, including offshore transfer of semi-standardised cargo and bulk liquids, and ground support to helicopter operations at North Sea gas installations. His responsibilities include navigational planning, documentation, communications, aspects of safety and loading, training of officer cadets and leading on deck as necessary, and so on.
40. In a similar vein, while it is understandable the overall availability of military courses is constrained for both regulars and reservists, in these circumstances it impacts more acutely on the reservist who is limited by time and availability. We recommend that Defence should be more forward leaning in making use of appropriate civilian courses and the recognition and accreditation of civilian qualifications, in lieu of military courses. There is also scope to take the lessons from greater use of distributed learning during the COVID-19 pandemic to support Reserve training and education.

#### **Estate**

41. The Reserve and Cadet Estate (Volunteer Estate (VE)) consists of some 5,000 buildings spread over 2,147 sites across the UK (1,790 of these locations are Cadet sites). The VE comprises some 68% of the total Defence sites by number, but occupies only 5% in area and 3% of its running costs. Most of the VE consists of relatively basic infrastructure spread over many small, low value land parcels. As with the wider Defence estate, just under 50% of the VE is 50 years old. The vast majority of the VE is Army and faces the same challenges of the regular estate – high maintenance and modernisation cost and unfunded life-cycle replacement liabilities.

42. We had been advocating a review of the VE and we are pleased to report that the Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Association Estate Review report was delivered to SofS at the end of January 2021 as planned. The purpose of the Review was to deliver a common understanding of the Estate; identify opportunities to rationalise and optimise in order to unlock long term value; and offer challenge to go further in this rationalisation and optimisation. All aimed at optimising and modernising the VE so that it becomes more of an asset than a liability.
43. While in previous reports we have said that the VE is in decline because funding has been primarily on reactive (fix-on-fail) maintenance expenditure, the Review noted that it was in fair or good condition of repair – perhaps relative when compared to the Regular Estate – although it is presentationally poor and in places unfit to support the training needs of the Reserve. Not counting the funding from the Services earmarked for a particular new project, or upgrades to current buildings or sites, in Financial Year (FY) 21/22 the VE has been funded for little more than reactive maintenance and carrying out statutory and mandatory inspections and tests. The VE has a backlog of £381m of unfunded RDEL and CDEL maintenance and sustainment tasks, yet in FY21/22 it has received only £0.824m of RDEL for sustainment, and **no CDEL, having had its entire £3m of CDEL sustainment funding taken as a savings measure**. This only can exacerbate the problems caused by lack of investment.
44. Since April 2018, funding for infrastructure has been delegated to the single Services. This brought about a much more capability-based approach to the estate and a prioritisation of funding towards the sustainment of the estate, rather than just a focus predominantly on reactive maintenance spend. The same cannot be said of the VE as maintenance and sustainment funding for it remains a Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) responsibility, consequently, there remains a disconnect between the users of the estate, who bear the safety and capability risks associated with it, and the funders of it. The focus on arresting the long-standing and so called, 'managed decline' of the Regular Estate by its users and funders, the Services, is not being replicated on the VE, which continues to degrade in condition.
45. The Review provides reason for hope and we fully support its aim to identify opportunities to optimise and rationalise – as we have said before, the VE is too large and underutilised; there still are sites earmarked for disposal from the FR20 programme (Project NEWBURY) that sit empty consuming valuable estate funding. We welcome the assurance that the Review was not a disposal exercise, nor one with targets for disposal in order to generate receipts, and we agree with the proposal that all receipts should be reinvested back into the VE.
46. However, even if these opportunities are seized, there will remain a significant number of assets requiring significant sustainment expenditure if they are to continue to be able to provide the Services with safe and environmentally sustainable capabilities, fit for the 21st century and demonstrative of commitment to the Whole Force ethos from an estate's perspective.
47. **We also welcome the Review's challenge to go further, but would urge caution in implementation.** A consistent theme from our visits was that the Reserve does not always receive the prominence they deserve for societal engagement. As the regular Defence estate reduces, in many areas especially in the devolved administrations, the Reserve (and Cadets) are the only representatives of Defence. This is not always recognised by the devolved

administrations or valued as a Defence output and the potential value of the Reserve element perhaps is not harnessed as effectively as it might be.

48. The need for a regional footprint, proximity to population centres and manageable travel time from work/home locations to aid recruiting, can be at odds with the purist approach to an efficient estate – one which is maximised for the overall number of units and reservists. It requires the input of commanders, not just the managers of the estate. Previous reviews, having been equally bold in design, but have never quite delivered the vision because of the many competing factors that influence the laydown of the VE. To this end, upfront funding is required with a recognition that the investment required to facilitate change can prove more to be more costly than at first anticipated, while receipts might not be so great.
49. On our visits, we were much impressed by what the RN has done to both HMS KING ALFRED in Portsmouth and HMS CAMBRIA in Cardiff, which are a testament, as we have noted before, to the RN's approach and use of FR20 funding to improve their Reserve estate and make it fit for purpose.
50. The situation with the Army is less positive. We have reported before on the impact of the delay, or a 'pause' on implementing FR20 projects as a result of in-year saving measures. In effect, while an in-year financial target might be met, the overall cost of a project is increased. These continue. As examples:
  - a. The project to locate 154 Transport Regiment RLC in one reserve centre in Dunfermline was ready to be tendered in February 2020, but it was paused in March 2020 as an imposed in-year saving measure. Anticipating that this delay would result in increased costs, a bid for additional funding was agreed for February 2021. Even so, it is not anticipated that the main business case will be approved until October 2021. Currently, professional fees to re-start the project have added £90K, but there will be other increases due to rises in costs of construction materials and labour since the work was originally tendered in 2018/19. To compound the problem, as the original allocation of money for the project was based on calculations dating back to 2010, only two thirds of what is required to complete the re-build of the ARC on one site is currently funded. Until the final stage is funded, the unit will need to occupy the adjacent Bothwell House site, further delaying any disposal receipts for that site.
  - b. A new build at Horfield Army Reserve Centre (ARC) in Bristol should have been completed in FY 20/21 for 7 Military Intelligence Battalion. Due to the paused funding, the tender process is only just being awarded (June 2021); it will be a stretch to complete the work in FY 21/22 (the original Project NEWBURY completion date was FY17/18). The planning approval will expire in May 2022; any further delay will result in additional work being placed on a stretched estate management team to renew the approval, and extra cost.
  - c. Similarly, a new build of essential technical accommodation at Keynsham ARC in North Somerset, due for construction in FY21/22 for 101 Battalion REME, may only be completed in FY22/23 (once again, the original Project NEWBURY completion date was FY17/18). In this case, the lack of a funding stream has also delayed the completion of design consultancy work, and there is a risk that planning approval may expire before work can start. Any further slippage may see these projects completed nearly 10 years after FR20 was announced.

In all of the examples, an additional factor, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, is that contractors are reporting a shortage of staff and rising costs and long delivery times for steel and timber. Any further delay might require tenders to be revisited to account for increased costs.

## RESERVIST HEALTH

51. We have commented the challenges facing units to keep track of reservist medical fitness because, while Occupational Health is delivered by Defence Primary Health Care (DPHC) organisation, the NHS is responsible for primary and secondary healthcare. Furthermore, DPHC does not have access to NHS medical records of reservists.
52. There is time in routine and planned mobilisation and deployment of the Reserve to bring reservists up to the medical standards required, such as for those reservists deployed on Operations TOSCA, CABRIT and others. Operation RESCRIPT demonstrated that there are varying standards of medical administration between units – not all understand the responsibilities of the unit and individual – with some units very well prepared, others not so. Moreover, there is no requirement in policy for Reserve personnel to be kept in-date for UK vaccinations (e.g. a 10 yearly tetanus booster) as is the case for regular personnel. Consequently, the 'Theatre Entry Standard (TES)' medical standard set by the SJC meant that only 1961 reservists were immediately deployable, while 2689 required appointments for vaccinations – 43% for a tetanus booster and 39% for a MMR vaccination.
53. While there is a need for better administration and preparation, additional resources will be required to allow the latter, if the Reserve is to be called on more frequently and at short notice as envisaged. Project CORTISONE – the development of Defence medical information systems to improve connectivity will address this to some extent. As will the need to keep medical information up to date as a requirement to qualify for a Certificate of Efficiency and Training Bounty.
54. To address medical preparedness, we made some recommendations in last year's report – annual health declaration, periodic medicals linked to birthdays, vaccinating reservists on entry at the end of basic training when they are already 'captive' in a military establishment. RF30 recommended that processes are reviewed "*...to improve reservists' medical and dental readiness for tasks.*"<sup>16</sup> **We would go further and observe that medical standards for reservists, particularly those in the Reinforcement Reserve, will need to be the same as for regulars with time, resources and access to medical facilities for vaccinations, appointments hearing tests etc.**
55. In terms of delivering the medical services to the Reserve, DPHC report the following:

**Occupational Health.** *The period from April 2020–April 2021 saw a decrease in out of hours activity from 3,600 to 2,400 appointments, however this should be seen in the context of continued support to the employment of reserve personnel on MACA tasks. During the whole period access to DPHC facilities has been limited by COVID restrictions. The Reserve Occupational Health teams have demonstrated agility and tenacity in adapting the way they work to incorporate remote working as well as delivering necessary face to face clinics particularly to support force preparation both for UK MACA taskings and operational deployments to Ops CABRIT, TOSCA, SHADER, TRENTON and TORAL during this period. Reserve OH teams have delivered*

16. RF30 Report, page 12, recommendation D6.

in the region of 9,000 in hours appointments during the same period. The number of appointments delivered to Reserve personnel by DPHC as a whole is not currently available.

**Rehabilitation.** Reservists are entitled to rehabilitation services when injured on military duty. Reserve personnel can self-refer to Primary Care Rehabilitation Facilities (PCRF) that are co-located with DPHC medical facilities. Current data do not provide numbers of Reserve personnel accessing this service, however forthcoming changes to record keeping will provide data on Reserve access.

**Dental Inspections.** DPHC Dental offers assessment and any necessary restorative work for reserve personnel nominated for mobilised service (from up to six months prior to mobilisation), or who is being held at high readiness (R5, 30 days' notice to move, or less). This offer is well received, when reservists are aware of the entitlement, but DPHC continues to see low numbers of reservists accessing this service.

**Mental Health.** DPHC continues to see modest demand for access to mental health care by members of the Reserve. Revision to Annex C of JSP950 Lft 2-7-2 outlines expanded entitlement to Defence mental health services, notably:

- a. Non-mobilised reservists who have deployed on operations from 1 Jan 82 onwards (this was previously 1 Apr 2003), regardless of whether any part of this service was as a regular member of the Armed Forces, where their mental health problem is thought to be related to operational deployment;
- b. Those serving in Limited Commitment (LC) or Home Commitment (HC) Full-time Reserve Service (FTRS) positions. For this group the presenting problem does not need to be related to operational deployment but should have an impact on their functioning in their current FTRS role.

## ASSESSMENT

56. This year's review has highlighted a number of positives in the state of the Reserve and in particular, the clear requirement in the IR and the RF30 Reviews to deliver a Whole Force. The ambition of the MOD and Services, even though necessary to deliver defence outputs, is to be applauded. But, while RF30 remains unfunded, it only represents ambition and direction of travel, but not a programme in the sense of FR20 and there will need to be a clear and undiluted determination to deliver the intent over the years ahead. We welcome all the ideas to 'unlock the potential' of the Reserve, but caution that careful consideration and that reservists thinking and expertise is required and integrated into all Lines of Development in order to ensure success.



**Annexes:**

- A. Some Reflections on the History of Reserve Forces in the United Kingdom.
- B. External Reporting Provisions of the Defence Reform Act 2014.
- C. External Scrutiny Team Terms of Reference.
- D. Secretary of State for Defence Response to 2020 EST report.
- E. Previous Report Recommendations – 2013 to 2020.
- F. Defence Statistics – Reserve Manning Achievement & Trends.
- G. Reservist Mobilisation and Deployments.
- H. 2021 Report Main Recommendations.
- I. Summary of Priorities for 2021/22 Work.
- J. External Scrutiny Team – Membership.



## Some Reflections on the History of Reserve Forces in the United Kingdom

The last decade has seen profound changes in the organisation and role of the UK's Reserve forces.<sup>1</sup> Until the end of the Cold War Reserve forces were essentially designed as auxiliaries for use in times of major crisis and wars of national survival. But the years since 1991 saw reservists increasingly deployed on wars of choice such as in Former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan. The Future Reserves 2020 programme addressed this mismatch by integrating Reserves and Regulars in the 'Whole Force Approach'. Undoubtedly, this was a necessary reform in the light of the changing strategic and social environment. However, there is always the risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. This appendix seeks to provide some historical context for the current situation, highlighting some enduring themes that remain of relevance to Reserve Forces in the 2020s.

During Twentieth Century, Britain used its Reserve forces as a framework for the expansion of the armed forces in time of crisis. British foreign policy before 1914, which aligned the UK with France and Russia against Germany (without a formal alliance), was out of synch with defence policy. This was an example of political expediency producing strategic illiteracy; for the obvious corollary to Britain's foreign policy was the creation of a mass army to fight alongside its partners on the European continent. This did not happen. Thus in 1914 the newly-appointed Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, who understood the strategic situation all too well, had to improvise a continental-sized army. In the absence of detailed pre-war plans, Kitchener chose not to rely purely on using the existing framework of the Territorial Force. Instead, he created the 'New' or 'Kitchener' Armies, which grew in parallel with the expansion of the Territorials, leading to some inefficiency and duplication of effort. The strategic and human consequences of these flawed pre-war decisions were profound.

In the Second World War things were handled rather better – up to a point. For instance, the Auxiliary Air Force was created after the First World War and was supplemented by the formation of the Air Force Volunteer Reserve in 1936, as war with Germany grew more likely.<sup>2</sup> Based on the experience of 1914-18, the decision was taken in the interwar period to expand a future army solely using the extant Territorial structure. However, the Chamberlain government's decision in the spring of 1939 to double the size of the Territorial Army (as it had been renamed) had a deleterious impact on the TA. This decision was taken on political and not military grounds, and left the Territorials simultaneously coping with a mass of fresh volunteers, setting up new units, and training existing part-time soldiers – all with insufficient equipment. Nevertheless, there was less improvisation in 1939-40 than there had been in the comparable situation of 1914-15. Although bedevilled by practical problems, and exacerbated by political expediency, the pre-war decision to plan for the use of Reserve forces as the basis for expansion of the armed forces in time of national emergency was clearly sound.

In the early months of both world wars, Reservists made up a considerable portion of the mobilised armed forces, especially in the Army. In August 1914 as many as 60% of the personnel of infantry battalions were ex-Regulars recalled to the colours, and in 1915 and 1939-40 Territorial units and formations comprised significant accretions of strength to the British armies deployed to France and Belgium. The consequence was that, fighting alongside the Regulars, Reservists suffered heavy losses on operations and had to be replaced in turn by volunteers and conscripts from civilian life. This situation has potential parallels with the current situation. The refiguring of the Reserve from 2010 onwards to be more closely integrated with the Regulars has produced a situation where the armed forces lack strength in depth. At present the prospect of the UK being involved in a sizeable, prolonged, and personnel-intensive conflict which results in casualties that are significant (by contemporary if not historic standards), appears remote. However, there is no guarantee that this situation will continue to be the case for ever more. At the very least it would be prudent to have plans for significant

1. It is important to differentiate between 'Reservists', former Regulars who as part of their terms of service were liable to be recalled to the colours in times of emergency, perhaps undergoing a certain amount of training during their time on the reserve; and part-time service personnel who combined military service with civilian life. The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, Royal Auxiliary Air Force and Territorial Army were examples of the latter category, and unless otherwise specifies, it is personnel of this type that is referred to in this piece. Arguably, recent developments, including the discontinuing of distinctive Royal Naval Reserve insignia, and adoption of the term 'Army Reserve', albeit subdivided in 'Army Reserve Soldiers' and 'Regular Reservists', have blurred the distinctions. <https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/the-army-reserve/> viewed 16 June 2021.

expansion of the Reserve forces. In that sense, in some future emergency it would be vastly preferable to be in the position of the UK in 1939 rather than the UK of 1914.

Historically, the culture of Reserve forces has been rather different from that of their Regular counterparts. Even in Regular units, individuals did not automatically abandon civilian attitudes and ways of behaving upon enlisting. The Regular services provided a 'total' environment and this, combined with a process of training designed to break down and remould personalities, tended to produce a particular culture. For Reservists, who for most of the year returned home after duty and slept in their own beds, it was a different matter. They tended to remain 'citizens (or civilians) in uniform'. For example, relations between the ranks were often markedly less formal than in Regular units, and there was less emphasis on external aspects of discipline. This difference in culture was both a strength and a weakness. It could produce very high levels of unit cohesion in the sense of comradeship, and that people who found that military life was not to their taste could leave with relative ease. However, when Regular NCOs or officers arrived at Reserve units, this could result in mutual culture shock if they came in with a 'new broom' approach. Reserve units had to be handled carefully to get the best out of them. At least in times of peace, many, perhaps most, Regulars posted in realised this and adapted their approach accordingly. Some did not, with unhappy results.

One unavoidable disadvantage for Reservists was that they could not train as often as Regulars. In both 1914 and 1939 Reserve units required intensive training upon mobilisation to get to the required standard. In 1914 and 1915 entire Territorial units, brigades and divisions were sent on active service with inadequate training and suffered as a consequence. The same was true of some Territorials deployed to Norway and France in 1940. During two of the world wars, Regular fears about the quality of Territorial training contributed to worries, justified or not, about the effectiveness of Territorials, especially officers. This in turn led to a glass ceiling on promotion. It was difficult for a Territorial officer to rise to 1 Star level, exceptionally rare to get to 2 Star, and impossible to get beyond that. In contrast to the wartime Australian and Canadian armies, both essentially built upon the equivalents of the Territorials and where non-professional soldiers could rise to high command, the British Regular Army effectively excluded citizen officers, no matter how talented, from its highest ranks.

A similar distrust of what were perceived as 'amateurs' in the two world wars led to colonisation of Territorial units by Regular officers and NCOs. In 1939-40, for example, a number of commanders of Territorial infantry battalions were removed. This was not necessarily a reflection on the quality of the individuals concerned – one had a Victoria Cross from the First World War and a distinguished record as a commander – but was the consequence of a belief that part-time commanders could not possibly be as efficient as Regulars who devoted all of their working hours to the role. Although undoubtedly unfair on individuals, this policy was underpinned by some ruthless logic: the stakes were too high to take risks. In the latter stages of both the 1914-18 and 1939-45 wars, non-professional officers (including pre-war Territorials) who had demonstrated their leadership credentials within the total environment of the Army, were able to gain promotion – although, as already noted, only up to a certain level of seniority.

The clash of cultures between Reserve and Regular forces has been expressed in rivalries, banter, and competition, mostly healthy. Sometimes this had a nasty edge. In the late 1930s, men of the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve who joined as sergeants were treated with hostility by some long service Regular RAF sergeants, who had, as they saw it, earned their stripes the hard way. Volunteers for the Reserve forces members have usually admired the skill and professionalism of their Professional counterparts, but on occasion felt undervalued, as in the early Twenty-First century nickname 'ARABS' – Arrogant Regular Army Bastards.

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2. Both organisations were later given the 'Royal' prefix.
  3. Timothy Edmunds, Antonia Dawes, Paul Higate, K. Neil Jenkins & Rachel Woodward (2016) 'Reserve forces and the transformation of British military organisation: soldiers, citizens and society', *Defence Studies*, 16:2, (2016), p.120
  4. [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/885861/Armed\\_Forces\\_Continuous\\_Attitude\\_Survey\\_2020\\_Main\\_Report.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/885861/Armed_Forces_Continuous_Attitude_Survey_2020_Main_Report.pdf), viewed 16 June 2021
  5. Ian F.W. Beckett, *The Amateur Military Tradition 1558-1945* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991) p.221.
  6. Wishing to avoid conscription was also a motive.

This was a response to the Regular jibe of 'STABS' – Stupid TA Bastards. Clearly, if genuinely integrated armed forces were to be created, cultural barriers needed to be overcome. It seems that the campaigns of the last three decades, when Reservists deployed in significant numbers, especially on operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (28,000 between 1997 and 2008<sup>3</sup>), have taken large steps to doing just that. The 2020 Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey shows that of Regular personnel from all services 'have had working contact with Armed Forces Reserves' and 74% viewed Reserves as 'Professional', 73% as 'Valuable' and 66% as 'Well-integrated'. All these figures represented a slight improvement on those of the previous year, with Army personnel in particular showing a more positive view of Reserves.<sup>4</sup> All this marks a significant alteration in attitudes from the historical norm.

In years gone by, Reservists and Reserve forces were more visible and had a greater connection to wider society. More generally, they were (and are) a bridge between the military and civilian worlds. However, voluntary service in Reserve forces has always been a niche interest. This was true even in the Edwardian period when in many ways circumstances were very favourable. The Territorial Force, created in 1908, rose to a strength of 269,000 in 1909, but declined to 246,000 in 1913. Both figures were far short of the original target, and re-enlistment rates were low.<sup>5</sup> However Reserve forces have also been the vehicle for expression of mass patriotism, especially in times of national crisis: the Munich Crisis of September-October 1938 and the introduction of conscription in the following May stimulated recruiting to the Territorials and the RAFVR.<sup>6</sup> This was very much an exception to the rule. The unsung heroes of the Reserve were the hard-core of highly motivated and committed women and men who were crucial in keeping the Reserve flame alight during by tolerating poor conditions, public indifference or even ridicule,<sup>7</sup> and neglect by government. Such Reservists served out of a sense of duty and patriotism, but also because they found part-time military service personally and professionally satisfying. Historically, keeping these people onside was critical to the health, even the survival, of Reserve forces. As recently as 2010, the UK reserve forces were 'in serious decline in terms of numbers, capability and morale'.<sup>8</sup>

As EST reports have highlighted, while there is no room for complacency, FR2020 has been largely successful in addressing these problems. In 2019 an independent academic team argued that FR2020 had had the effect of 'reinvigorating the reserves'.<sup>9</sup> The remarkable contribution made by Reserve Forces personnel to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is evidence of the steady evolution of the role of the UK's Reserve Forces over the last few years.<sup>10</sup> Reserves now routinely amount to some 10% of the UK's deployed forces. Simply stated, generally commanders cannot deliver outputs without reserve input. Snapshots of the significance of Reserves include back-to-back tours in 2020 by Army Reserve units on Op TOSCA, the UK's component of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 7 Rifles being relieved by its sister battalion, 6 Rifles; and in the same year, elements of the Royal Yeomanry deploying to Poland as part of a US battlegroup (Op CABRIT). Moreover, drawing upon evidence of the Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey, EST reports reflect that Regulars have become much more appreciative of members of the Reserve. This cultural change, which is a process rather than an event, is highly significant.

The author, who began his career in military education, came to the external scrutiny team this year having had relatively little contact with the military for the last 6-7 years. His impression is that, peering behind the curtain, as it were, FR2020 has indeed brought about important changes to the Reserves. Compared to the recent and distant past they are more focused on the immediate need, are more flexible, and better integrated. However, this is a very good start rather than an end in itself. Specifically, the lack of thinking about the role of Reserve Forces should a future emergency demand major expansion of the Armed Forces needs to be addressed. More generally, the bold ambitions in RF30 must be realised to cement these reforms of FR2020, and to build upon them. If this is done properly, the days of Reserve Forces being the poor relations of the Regulars will be banished, to the benefit of all, not least the United Kingdom.

7. Reserve forces have always had something of an image problem with wider society, something which stretches back at least to the mid-nineteenth century.

8. Future Reserves 2020: The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces (London, The Stationery Office, 2011), p.17.

9. Patrick Bury and Sergio Catignani, 'Future Reserves 2020, the British Army and the politics of military innovation during the Cameron era', *International Affairs*, (Vol. 95, Issue 3, 2019), p.701. See however the authors' caveats.

10. Future Reserves 2020: The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces (London, The Stationery Office, 2011), p.6.



## EXTERNAL REPORTING PROVISIONS OF THE DEFENCE REFORM ACT 2014

The Defence Reform Act 2014 placed a responsibility on Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations to submit an annual report on the state of the UK's Reserve Forces under the following provisions:<sup>1</sup>

### 113A Duty to prepare report on volunteer Reserve Forces

- (1) An association must prepare an annual report on the state of the volunteer reserve forces so far as concerns the area for which the association is established.
- (2) A report on the state of the volunteer reserve forces is a report that sets out the association's assessment of the capabilities of the volunteer reserve forces, having regard to the duties that may be imposed on members of those forces by or under this Act or any other enactment.
- (3) The assessment referred to in subsection (2) must, in particular, include the association's views on the effect of each of the following matters on the capabilities of the volunteer reserve forces:
  - (a) the recruiting of members for the volunteer reserve forces;
  - (b) the retention of members of those forces;
  - (c) the provision of training for those forces;
  - (d) the upkeep of land and buildings for whose management and maintenance the association is responsible.
- (4) A report under subsection (1) must also set out the association's assessment of the provision that is made as regards the mental welfare of members and former members of the volunteer reserve forces.
- (5) An association must send a report under subsection (1) to the Secretary of State –
  - (a) in the case of the first report, before the first anniversary of the day on which the last Future Reserves 2020 report prepared before the coming into force of this section was presented to the Secretary of State, and
  - (b) in the case of subsequent reports, before the anniversary of the day on which the first report was laid before Parliament under subsection (6).
- (6) On receiving a report under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must lay a copy of it before Parliament.
- (7) The duties under this section may, instead of being performed by an association, be performed by a joint committee appointed under section 116 by two or more associations in relation to their combined areas.
- (8) Where by virtue of subsection (7) a joint committee has the duty to prepare a report –
  - (a) references in subsections (1) to (5) to an association are to be read as if they were to the joint committee, and
  - (b) section 117(1)(a) (power to regulate manner in which functions are exercised) has effect as if the reference to associations were to the joint committee.
- (9) In subsection (5)(a), 'Future Reserves 2020 report' means a report prepared by the External Scrutiny Group on the Future Reserves 2020 programme.

1. Inserted in Part 11 of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 (reserve associations), after section 113.

## COUNCIL OF RESERVE FORCES' AND CADETS' ASSOCIATIONS EXTERNAL SCRUTINY TEAM: TERMS OF REFERENCE

### INTRODUCTION

1. The FR20 Report<sup>1</sup> was commissioned by the Prime Minister in October 2010 in recognition of the relative decline and neglect of Reserve Forces.

### PURPOSE

2. The Commission identified<sup>2</sup> a requirement for an annual report on the overall state of the Reserve Forces. It recommended that the Council of Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations (CRFCA) was best placed to meet this requirement, given its existing provision by (non-discretionary) statute to provide independent advice to the Defence Council and Ministers on Reserve Matters. The Defence Reform Act 2014 sets out the duty of the CRFCA to prepare annual reports of the state of the volunteer Reserve Forces. Roles and responsibilities in the production of the reports are set out in the Enabling Agreement.<sup>3</sup>

### ROLE

3. The CRFCA External Scrutiny Team is to report to the Secretary of State for Defence on the state of the volunteer Reserve Forces and provide independent assurance to Parliament.

### MEMBERSHIP

4. After consultation with the MOD, the RFCAs will appoint the Chair of the CRFCA External Scrutiny Team. The Chair will be appointed for a maximum of five years.
5. Membership of the External Scrutiny Team should be no greater than eight, to be decided by the Chair after consultation with the MOD through VCDS. It should provide representation from the three single Services, appropriate Regular and Reserve experience and independent expertise. Whilst its composition may change, the External Scrutiny Team must retain the expertise that enables the Chair to perform his duties effectively. The membership should include at least one member who is able to assess the provision made as regards the mental welfare of members and former members of the Reserve Forces.

### BASELINE AND METRICS

6. 1 April 12 is to be taken as the baseline date from which progress of the Future Reserves 2020 Programme will be assessed.
7. RF&C will undertake coordinating activity with the single Services to ensure that the External Scrutiny Team has the assistance it requires to enable them to assess trends based on MOD manning and demographic information (such as age). Metrics to be routinely monitored are to be agreed in consultation with the MOD but may include:
  - a. Outflow rate and return of service;
  - b. Fit for Employment; Fit for Role; Fit for Deployment;
  - c. Percentage achieving bounty;
  - d. Gapping levels of Regular, Reserve, FTRS and Civilian Permanent Staff who support the Reserve community.

1. Future Reserves 2020: The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces. July 2011.

2. Para 104 (p. 43).

3. Enabling Agreement dated 7 October 2014.

## ASSESSMENT

8. The External Scrutiny Team's report is to be set in the context of the ability of the Reserves to deliver capability required by Defence, and should assess the state of the Reserves including:
  - a. progress against delivery of the FR20 Mandates and in the context of the recommendations of the FR20 Report, the condition of the Reserves.and beyond the FR20 Programme:
  - b. the recruiting of members for the volunteer Reserve Forces;
  - c. the retention of members of those Forces;
  - d. the provision of training for those Forces;
  - e. the upkeep of land and buildings for whose management and maintenance the Associations are responsible.
9. CRFCA will be involved in the development of the Programme through the Reserves Executive Committee.

## ACCESS

10. RF&C will assist in facilitating access to serving military personnel, sites and furnishing additional data as required.

## COSTS

11. Funding to cover the External Scrutiny Team's total personal expenses in the order of £9-10K pa<sup>4</sup> has been agreed. RF&C will provide advice on the submission of claims and recovery of expenses.

## MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS

12. Media engagement, if necessary, is to be conducted through MOD DDC in conjunction with RF&C.

## DATE AND FREQUENCY OF REPORTS

13. The External Scrutiny Team shall present a report to the Secretary of State for Defence annually, reflecting the requirements of the Defence Reform Act 2014.
14. The Secretary of State for Defence will deliver the report to Parliament.

4. This is recognised as an early estimation and reflecting steady-state costs beyond Yr1. CRFCA can bid for further funding as required as part of GIA.


**SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE RESPONSE TO 2020 EST REPORT**

Ministry  
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MSU/4/4/2/10/is



23 June 2021

Dear Major General Lalor,

Thank you for the External Scrutiny Team's 2020 report and for the work the team was able to undertake despite the difficulties presented to your visit programme by the Covid 19 restrictions. I am sorry for the delay in responding.

The report covers what was an exceptionally busy period for the Armed Forces, including the Reserves. The Annex to this letter contains Defence's response to the specific recommendations contained in the report but, as ever, I should also like to offer some more general comments.

I was pleased that the report acknowledges the immensely valuable support that the Reserves provided to Defence operations in the UK and overseas, and in particular to the national response to the Covid 19 pandemic. We are most grateful for the positive way in which reservists and their employers and families responded to call-out. Reservists did not hesitate to volunteer when asked and the vast majority of employers were extremely supportive.

The Reserves' contribution to Op RESCRIPT was a great demonstration of their utility and flexibility in dealing with a domestic emergency. Thanks to this 'can-do' approach, Reserves were instrumental in enabling the MOD to respond quickly and effectively to requests for help from other parts of government, while also maintaining the ability to continue its standing tasks. Reservists are among those continuing to offer support as Liaison Officers to other government departments, as planners and to support mobile testing and the Vaccination Task Force.

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
I should also like to record my thanks to the many people who organised and supported the mass mobilisation for the Covid response. This was carried out in far more complex circumstances than in 2012, which was the last time Defence needed to mobilise large numbers of reservists at pace. In the first instance, mobilisation centres had to comply with Covid 19 regulations, meaning there was less face-to-face interaction between reservists and mobilisation centre staffs and more use of remote processes. The Services also had to ensure they did not call out people who were key workers in their civilian jobs. This not only meant excluding people in medical and healthcare roles but also, as a less-obvious example, people who worked to produce, manufacture and distribute food. Aside from these considerations, Defence also had to engage with other government departments to determine how reservists and employers should be compensated when people who had been placed on furlough as a result of the pandemic were mobilised. These novel factors, I believe, set the mobilisation for Op RESCRIPT apart from others conducted in the past. I am proud of the way MOD and the Services were able to adapt to address these complex issues.

That is not to say, of course, that lessons cannot be learned and taken forward into future planning. The mobilisation of reservists to meet ongoing operational commitments is now routine business and enables reservists and employers to make proper plans plan for their absence. We can, however, use the experience gained in 2020 to help us decide whether we can make permanent adjustments to our routine processes, and how we can best adapt in the event that we need to mobilise at scale and at pace. The Ex Agile Stance Campaign Plan is in part intended to help clarify what Defence would need to do in such circumstances. If, for example, the Campaign Plan identifies a requirement within headquarters and chains of command for more training to be devoted to mobilisation policy and process, I expect this to be acted upon.

The recent publication of the Integrated Review and the Command Paper "Defence in a Competitive Age" have set the course for Defence in the coming decade. We have made it clear that the Reserves will have to play a key role in the evolution of our Armed Forces. The Reserve Forces 2030 review has also made proposals to increase the utilisation of the Reserves and we will continue to work to develop these ideas. The RFCAs, as organisations in their own right and through the Defence Relationship Management organisations, have helped Defence to achieve a better and mutually beneficial relationship with industry and employers and a greater understanding of the Armed Forces and Reserves in society. As our strategic thinking on the Future Force develops, we will look to the RFCAs for support in communicating our reasoning and intent to employers and to help us understand and address any questions and concerns they may have.

The past year has demonstrated Defence's ability to adapt its business processes in response to an unprecedented challenge. The propositions in the Command paper and the RF30 report will further transform the Reserves experience and will, I hope, see reservists being afforded an even greater range of opportunities to support Defence over the coming years. I am confident that we have a cohort of reservists who are motivated and ready for the challenge of becoming an ever more integrated element of the whole force.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Ben Wallace". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, circular initial "B" and a long, sweeping horizontal stroke at the end.

**THE RT HON BEN WALLACE MP**

## **RFCA EXTERNAL SCRUTINY TEAM RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS**

**20.1 That all three Services develop and maintain financial incentives to recruit ex-regulars, particularly for those trades and skills that are expensive to train and develop, acknowledging that this is a cost-effective method for manning the Reserve (paragraph 15).**

Financial incentives (FI) can play an important role in recruiting and retaining personnel in key employment areas in certain circumstances. Recent Armed Forces Pay Review Body Focus Groups have provided feedback that an attractive offer for Reserve service is not primarily based around financial reward, but more to do with opportunity to maintain links with Regulars, camaraderie and diversity of activity. We believe, therefore, that the focus of the Reserves in addressing any recruitment concerns should be in continuing to deliver an 'offer' that attracts recruits without the use of an FI. As with all FIs, if compelling evidence emerged that it would be helpful, the idea could be reconsidered.

**20.2 That the Reserve, through embedded part-time reserve staff posts, should be embedded in all aspects of the whole force**

- a. across all Defence Lines of Development (DLOD) – particularly force design and development**
- b. in the MOD Secretariat Policy Operations (SPO) – the MOD's operations cell - Standing Joint Command (SJC) Headquarters (HQ) and Land Operations Centre (LOC)**
- c. as operational staff of higher HQs (para 19).**

The increased utilisation of Reserves to support the broad range of Defence tasks can only help to break down any remaining cultural barriers between them and their Regular counterparts. Having more reservists working across the spectrum of roles in policy and command functions could be a way to reduce the risk of their requirements and utility being overlooked as policy and operational doctrine is developed. Going forward, the Services should aim to find the best person for the job, with a recognition that they will also need some individuals to fill particular posts for career development reasons. The SERVE jobs portal will be a means of bringing more opportunities to the attention of reservists. Longer term, the flexible service offer and the work to take forward the recommendations in the Reserve Forces 2030 review should lead to more opportunities for reservists across Defence.

**20.3 That an assessment is made on the requirement for an uplift of personnel to meet the workload of managing a mobilisation and that additional personnel are mobilised to reinforce the RHQ of the mobilising unit, as enablers, before and throughout deployment (paragraph 21b(1)).**

There are, of course, lessons to be taken forward from the response to the Covid 19 pandemic, including the ability to apply some flexibility to processes where it is appropriate to do so. The need to be flexible, however, also applies to the allocation of staff resources to advise on and manage mobilisation. The Services are equipped to manage the routine business of bringing reservists into permanent service and, as the team itself has observed, they were able to adapt to meet the increased demand

for support staff when there was an increased requirement to mobilise. The Agile Stance Campaign Plan has been designed to test and develop a responsive and agile strategic base. Identifying what will be needed to enable any future large-scale mobilisations and testing the findings is a key part of the plan.

**20.4 That the issue of the provision of REME support to equipment heavy units, whether for training or operations, is revisited as the current process does not appear to be working (paragraph 21b(2)).**

This issue is currently under review within the context of the ongoing work to refine the Army's response to both the Integrated Review and Reserve Forces 2030 (RF30). As part of the transformation to the Army announced in the Defence Command Paper, the Army Reserve will be fully integrated into the Regular structure of the future. This includes being fully integrated into the newly established Brigade Combat Teams (BCT). These BCT will be the means of grouping more deployable and sustainable whole force packages together, capable of integrated action. Work is ongoing to refine and test the future designs, capabilities and structures, and the Army are planning carefully to maximise the potential of their limited resources, particularly key equipment. This work is being cohered across the Defence Lines of Development and with RF30 through Army Reserve Transformation.

**20.5 That:**

- a. the services and the MOD review their plans for mobilisation so that it accommodates individuals as well as mobilising large numbers/units at short notice and rapidly.
- b. Reserve mobilisation expertise (staff posts with experience and expertise) is integrated into such areas as the SPO, SJC and LOC by creating embedded part-time reservist posts within those organisations
- c. the process for pre-mobilisation medicals is reviewed and appropriate standards adopted for overseas and homeland operations
- d. revised processes are exercised routinely not only in units but also the SPO, SJC and LOCs (paragraph 25).

Exercising mass mobilisation is now a factor at either the single Service level or within the Agile Stance Campaign Plan and could in future form part of the Defence Exercise Programme. Requirements for pre-mobilisation medicals will always be driven by operational requirement.

**20.6 That MOD considers reviewing the capacity of the RF&C staff branch in the MOD in order that it is manned adequately to meet the demands it is set (paragraph 28).**

When at its established strength, which it currently is, the Reserve Forces and Cadets division (RF&C) is appropriately staffed to deliver its function, which is to put the legal and policy mechanisms in place that enable reservists to be utilised. Conditions of Service, including pay and allowances, are managed as a whole force issue and are therefore appropriately the responsibility of other policy areas within the Defence People Team.

**20.7 That there is scope to consider developing a mobilisation package in support of those reservists deploying on shorter DAQTO, which is different to one that supports those on longer specific named operations or those that are more akin to warfighting (paragraph 29).**

There is no evidence that developing differentiated mobilisation packages depending on the task would increase the utilisation of volunteer Reserves, or that it would significantly reduce the costs of their utilisation. We would be reluctant to take any action that could risk eroding the protections and financial support that is available for employers and reservists when mobilised.

**20.8 That the requisite training courses are adapted through modularisation, distribution, concentration and remote/virtual learning, and are assessed and measured on this basis (paragraph 32).**

COVID conditions have acted as an accelerant to the trialling and testing of this model in many areas, where it has been extremely successful in mitigating the loss of face to face training opportunities. Learning from these most recent lessons, the challenge is to maximise the use of virtual and online delivery, making greater use of platforms such as the Defence Learning Environment and commercially available on-line training, while maintaining activity that cannot be carried out that way, such as simulators, or where students must act as a member of a team in very closely controlled safety critical situations.

**20.9 That the MOD urgently produces a transparent and agreed costing method across all three Services to compare the cost of regulars and reservists, drawing on the Land Military Capability Output Costs (LEMCO) (paragraph 36).**

The issue of the way that Defence utilise resources to meet its strategic objectives goes wider than comparing the costs of Regulars and Reserves. Defence operates a whole-force approach, blending military, civilian and contractor staff into a cohesive and powerful fighting force. Within the military alone, we draw on a range of commitment types, from Regular Service to Flexible engagements, Full Time Reserve Service, Mobilisation and attendance-based activity on Reserve Service Days. In the future, we expect the Defence force to encompass an even greater mix of workforce and commitment types. How these elements work together (and in combination with the wider National Security workforce and in the wider Defence sector) and how they are resourced to deliver Defence outputs remains under development as part of our future workforce planning capability. We have already made visible progress in breaking down the financial challenges to Reserves mobilisation through the Front-Line Commands optimising their planning processes.

**20.10 That:**

- a. any receipts raised through optimisation/rationalisation of the Volunteer Estate should be reinvested back into new estate or maintenance for the volunteer estate
- b. when the volunteer estate review reports, and if a programme of work is proposed or required, funding is identified and ring-fenced so

**that it is not subject to subsequent in-year budgetary pressures (paragraph 44).**

The RFCA Managed Estate Review has identified opportunities for rationalisation and improving utilisation of the RFCA estate. A key planning assumption within the cost model for the various options is for receipts to be reinvested within the RFCA estate to improve the condition, utilisation, enhance the lived experience and therefore capability. Any approach to implementation must be subject to more detailed studies, particularly in terms of funding strategy, and will need to cohere with the Integrated Review and RF30 outcomes. It will also be subject to the normal Department budgetary processes and procedures.

**20.11 That Reservists submit an annual health declaration (paragraph 48).**

This is being considered. However, any declaration would only be current from the date of completion and would not remove the requirement for a medical or medical consultation prior to a Reservist being brought into permanent service.

**20.12 That, like the Royal Navy, the Army and Royal Air Force undertake periodic medicals for their reservists, linked to age/birthdays (paragraph 48).**

The RAF already undertakes medicals on its reservists on joining, each time they re-engage and on mobilisation/demobilisation. The resourcing implications of carrying out more frequent routine medical screenings of reservists, perhaps to support their increased utilisation, will need to be considered by the RF30 implementation team in consultation with Defence Primary Healthcare.

**20.13 That such innovation (medical) required to facilitate the rapid mobilisation of the Reserve for Operation RESCRIPT are developed further, codified and adopted by all three Services (paragraph 50).**

The approach to Operation RESCRIPT showed that pragmatic medical standards could be set for UK tasking and this could set a useful precedent for future deployments. However, we must not expose individuals to unnecessary risk and those making medical decisions will always have to consider the nature of the task for which we are deploying personnel.



## PREVIOUS REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

### SUMMARY OF 2013 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

**Recommendation 13.1 (Link to the Commission's recommendations 3, 4 & 8)**

As a matter of priority the Department should issue a plain-English narrative which sets out the Reserves proposition: a narrative which is commonly adopted across all the Services and, as a minimum, covers the purposes of the Reserves; the manner in which they are likely to be used; and individual levels of obligation.

**Recommendation 13.2 (Link to the Commission's recommendations 6 & 12)**

FR20 manpower metrics should be more granular for the period to 2018 to demonstrate changes within the recruit inflow pipeline and should not concentrate solely on the achievement of Phase-2-trained Reservists.

**Recommendation 13.3 (Link to the Commission's recommendation 26)**

Priority must be given to fund and introduce quickly an effective management information system which accurately captures Reservists numbers; states of training, preparedness; availability; attendance; and skill sets.

**Recommendation 13.4**

More analysis is undertaken to determine the causes of 'manning churn', to better inform how retention measures could be better targeted.

**Recommendation 13.5 (Link to the Commission's recommendations 2 & 21)**

In parallel to development of pairing/parenting responsibilities, further analysis is needed for scaling of equipment and vehicle holdings at Reserve unit level, including the provision of low-tech simulation alternatives.

**Recommendation 13.6 (Link to the Commission's recommendations 5, 6, 17, 18 & 23)**

FR20 Army basing should take account of regional capacity to recruit, not just to facilitate proximity, and should also be phased to initially preserve current TA manpower until such time as alternative inflow is more fully developed.

**Recommendation 13.7 (Link to the Commission's recommendations 8, 22 & 23)**

That work is initiated to look at the potential to employ Reserves with critical skills, where their employment was best served in a reach-back rather than deployed role; and that their TACOS be examined for appropriate adjustment.

**Recommendation 13.8 (Link to the Commission's report, Annex C, paragraph 8)**

That senior military and political leadership initiate a comprehensive information campaign with the Services' middle management to address the cultural change necessary to secure FR20, drawing on the narrative we recommend above.

## SUMMARY OF 2014 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

**Recommendation 14.1** Further work on Whole Force and the New Employment Model, coupled with the desirability of easier transfers between Regular and Reserve service, suggest that the necessity of merging the Armed Forces' Act and the Reserve Forces' Act should be kept under review.

**Recommendation 14.2** The narrative developed for the White Paper should be updated to take account of FR20 delivery to date and used more extensively to market the value of Reserve service and the recruiting offer. It should also be used more extensively cross-Government.

**Recommendation 14.3** FR20 measures which seek to bring down the average age of Reservists should be phased to follow those measures which will rely heavily on Reservist knowledge and experience for their introduction.

**Recommendation 14.4** The single Services should examine the scope to apply a 'special measures approach' to turning round those units and sub-units most in need of assistance in reaching FR20 targets.

**Recommendation 14.5** The single Services should examine a range of measures which better preserve the corporate memory of their Reserve components, including procedures for recording whether and how savings measures are planned to be restored during programming.

**Recommendation 14.6** Recruiting processes should be subject to continuous improvement measures, with recognition that central marketing and advertising campaigns must be complemented by appropriately funded local/unit activity to nurture and retain applicants through the process.

**Recommendation 14.7** Final decisions on Reserve Centre laydown and unit/sub-unit closures should be re-tested against local recruiting capacity and retention factors.

**Recommendation 14.8** In order to ensure that necessary differences between Regular and Reserve service are appropriately managed, the single Services should consider the reintroduction of a dedicated Reserve career management staff branch (predominantly manned and led by Reservists) within their Personnel Headquarters.

**Recommendation 14.9** Command appointments of Reserve units should continue to provide opportunity for part-time volunteer officers. When part-time volunteers are appointed, command team manning of the unit should be reviewed to ensure that the commanding officer is fully supported with no gapping in key headquarters posts.

**Recommendation 14.10** The MOD should consider the option to restore the FR20 Commission's proposal that a contingency reserve fund should be established to be available for short duration domestic operations making use of Reserves.

## SUMMARY OF 2015 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

**Recommendation 15.1** The MOD give further consideration to how it will safeguard the ability of Reserves to play a proportionate part in resilience operations, especially once the Reserves are at full manning and would otherwise have to dilute funds for annual training to offset costs.

**Recommendation 15.2** Working within the existing governance system, build more inter-Service cooperation on experimentation and best practice on recruiting and retention, whether or not initiatives are universally adopted.

**Recommendation 15.3** The three Services should review the separate roles played by the national call centres, the Armed Forces Careers Offices, the recruiting field forces and Reserve units to ensure that they are clearly optimised for Reserve recruiting.

**Recommendation 15.4** The MOD and the Services should review the medical entry standards required of recruits and ensure that the screening contracts are appropriately incentivised and assured to achieve success.

**Recommendation 15.5** The Services should initiate work to determine the recruiting resources necessary to ensure steady state manning of the Reserve beyond the FR20 period.

**Recommendation 15.6** The Services should examine what more could be done to enhance manning through retention-positive measures, at least in the short term, including bespoke extra-mural activities targeted at the Reserve.

**Recommendation 15.7** FR20 planning and risk mitigation should increasingly turn more attention to the growth of capability within the Reserve component, rather than a slavish pursuit of numerical growth.

**Recommendation 15.8** Army Reserve basing requirements should be revisited as a consequence of availability of funds to deliver the original basing concept and on the evidence of other FR20 achievement; link to Recommendation 15.10.

**Recommendation 15.9** DIO and the Services should review their multi activity and support contracts and, where relevant, explore ways in which they can be amended to ensure that they are Reserve-friendly.

**Recommendation 15.10** The Services should conduct a command-led stock-take on all aspects of FR20 implementation by the end of FY 2015/16 and share lessons learned; link with recommendation 15.8.

## SUMMARY OF 2016 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

**Recommendation 16.1** An urgent contract review of the Army Recruiting Partnership.

**Recommendation 16.2** The Services undertake more granular analysis within their data gathering, to reduce the risk of specialist manning gaps in the final years of FR20 and beyond.

**Recommendation 16.3** The high incidence of medical deferrals and time to resolution remain under close scrutiny in order to reduce both.

**Recommendation 16.4** The Royal Navy and Army absorb recent innovations in officer Phase 1 training into their core officer development activity, as the issue will require sustained attention well beyond the timeframe of FR20.

**Recommendation 16.5** Consideration be given to greater cross-pollination, shared practice and coordination between the three Services in the officer recruiting environment, particularly in the area of achieving greater penetration of the Higher and Further Education recruiting hinterland.

**Recommendation 16.6** The Services keep under review the impact of losing Op FORTIFY enhancements (or Service equivalents) and, where appropriate to sustain recruiting beyond 2019, bring relevant elements into their core activity.

**Recommendation 16.7** The Services examine units which have a significant young officer deficit to determine whether a poor proposition might be the cause and, if so, to assess whether it can be legitimately improved.

**Recommendation 16.8** The Army consider how the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force use their Reserves in order to develop a better understanding of potential use of Auxiliaries in the Army Reserve; and that such analysis helps shape policies for the future employment system.

**Recommendation 16.9** The Army revisits the decision to withdraw LADs from Reserve units to create REME battalions.

**Recommendation 16.10** The manner in which Reserves can be routinely employed on national operations or for back-fill be revisited.

**Recommendation 16.11** The Reserve narrative be reviewed to ensure it cannot be interpreted as intent to prevent use of Reservists for routine mobilisation and on national operations.

**Recommendation 16.12** Work on defining the Army Reserve officer career pathway be re-invigorated.

**Recommendation 16.13** Defence reviews whether a more flexible range of employment terms should be considered, to better incentivise recruitment and to provide more agility within a whole force approach to employment.

**Recommendation 16.14** As options are considered for disposal of Regular estate, decisions are not taken before current or potential usefulness to Reserve capability-building has also been taken into account.

**Recommendation 16.15** MOD and the Services recognise incomplete cultural change will be the main impediment to FR20 delivery and long-term Reserve sustainability, and introduce specific measures to inculcate cultural change.

**Recommendation 16.16** The importance of localism for effective sub-unit command be addressed by simplifying systems where possible; providing adequate permanent staff support; and keeping training requirements at practical levels.

## SUMMARY OF 2017 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

**Recommendation 17.1** A repeat recommendation that a formal contract review of the Recruiting Partnership be undertaken. (Paragraph 19)

**Recommendation 17.2** That the continued employment of RSUSOs is revisited. (Paragraph 20)

**Recommendation 17.3** That the use of medical waivers during recruiting should be better advertised to RN and Army units, and other relevant participants in the recruiting chain. (Paragraph 21)

**Recommendation 17.4** That the Army should examine where the medical waiver authority is best lodged. (Paragraph 21)

**Recommendation 17.5** That the single Services should review their recruiting medical contracts to ensure assessments are carried out with a greater degree of consistency and common sense. (Paragraph 23)

**Recommendation 17.6** That the Services identify which units have experienced the most successful officer recruitment and explore the best means by which their successes can then be exported to less successful units. (Paragraph 24)

**Recommendation 17.7** The Army should revitalise work to create a Reserve officer career pathway. (Paragraph 28)

**Recommendation 17.8** That the Army develop and implement a policy to support appropriately Reserve unit commanding officers when the incumbent is a part time volunteer. (Paragraph 30)

**Recommendation 17.9** That the MOD, Joint Forces Command and the single Services review the terms under which Reserves are included on or in support of operations, in order to develop protocols which make their inclusion easier. (Paragraph 35)

**Recommendation 17.10** That the Services resist short-term in-year budgetary palliatives which directly or indirectly reduce routine Reserve activity. (Paragraph 37)

**Recommendation 17.11** That the Services now initiate work to determine optimum return-of-service/retention rate(s) for their Reserves and put in place measures to achieve them, with the same vigour that they have applied in their recruiting effort. (Paragraph 39)

**Recommendation 17.12** That work on the Reserves Estate Strategy be re-invigorated and accelerated, continuing to draw on local and regional expertise. We further recommend that priority is given to ensuring adequate funding is made available to sustain the existing VE until a new strategy can be implemented. (Paragraph 48)

**Recommendation 17.13** That the MOD update the work on mental health in the Services that it has undertaken with King's College and commission fresh work to look specifically at the current situation for Reserves. (Paragraph 51)

## SUMMARY OF 2018 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

**Recommendation 18.1** Given the challenging recruiting environment encountered by the three Services and the failure of the DRS, we recommend that the MOD and Services do not take further savings measures from the FR20 £1.8bn funding to manage FY18 in-year financial pressures. (Paragraph 15)

**Recommendation 18.2** We would welcome an update on the proposed revisions to JSP 950 when these actions are completed. (Paragraph 22)

**Recommendation 18.3** Given the criticality of DRS to the inflow of applicants to recruits, we recommend that 'Hypercare' is continued until all three services are confident that DRS works as intended reducing the 'time of flight' between application and being loaded on a Phase 1 recruit training course. (Paragraph 26)

**Recommendation 18.4** Linked to paragraphs 16-26 above, until the frictions in the recruiting system are ironed out, whether induced by DRS or Service policies, we recommend that Op FORTIFY measures, such as the RSUSO, are continued beyond FR20 until the Services hit their trained strength FR20 targets and they are confident that manning is on an even plateau. (Paragraph 27)

**Recommendation 18.5** We recommend that the three Services continue to examine that their courses - particularly those run by Training Schools - policies and processes and are adapted to take account of the needs of the reservist. (Paragraph 32)

**Recommendation 18.6** We recommend that MOD produce an agreed costing method to compare the cost of regulars and reservists, drawing on the above work and that done by the Land Environment Military Capability Output Costs (LEMCO), and examine the opportunities to further increase their utility and value to Defence. (Paragraph 36)

**Recommendation 18.7** We continue to recommend that MOD should consider the option to restore the FR20 Commission's proposal to establish a contingency reserve fund to be available for short notice and duration operations. (Paragraph 37)

**Recommendation 18.8** That the Reserves Estate Strategy be re-invigorated and accelerated, continuing to draw on local and regional expertise. We further recommend that priority is given to ensuring adequate funding is made available to sustain the existing Reserve estate until the new strategy is implemented. (Paragraph 49)

## SUMMARY OF 2019 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

**Recommendation 19.1** The MOD and the Services do not take further savings measures from the FR20 £1.8bn funding, given the FR20 programme trained strength targets have been missed and ask MOD and all Services to clarify what funding remains, and plans to spend it over the next four years. (Paragraph 7)

**Recommendation 19.2** That: the Services determine what is the optimum percentage of Reservists within a deployed force (between 5-8%), which meets the requirement to mobilise Reservists to sustain the Whole Force Model, while being sustainable in the long-term, and fund this accordingly in their annual spending programme. (Paragraph 12)

**Recommendation 19.3** That they [initiatives to allow for mobilisation on training tasks and a tiered mobilisation package for DAOTO] are developed further as a matter of priority, particularly the tiered mobilisation package as it would broaden the range of manning levers available to Commander, and thus enhance the utility of the Reserve, and answer the requirements to modernise, exploit and use the Reserve more efficiently as identified by the Commission. (Paragraph 16)

**Recommendation 19.4** That:

- The three Services review their ongoing support arrangements for Reserve recruiting, to ensure the successful lessons of FR20 are not discarded; and
- RSUSOs are taken onto units' permanent strengths now in recognition of the vital role they play. (Paragraph 18b)

**Recommendation 19.5** That similar work being done by the Australians and Canadians to minimise the steps in the [recruiting] process (including introducing a one-stop shop) is studied closely before the contract is re-let. We further recommend that ambitious targets should be set – one month if there are no issues, and six months if there are, and success or failure should be judged on these targets. (Paragraph 19)

**Recommendation 19.6** That the Services continue the drive to adapt their Service policies and practices to take account of the needs of the Reservist. (Paragraph 21)

**Recommendation 19.7** We recommend that the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force consider adopting such a system in order to ensure reservist knowledge and input is considered during policy formulation and operational planning, and be able to grow a Reservist (part-time) two star officer. (Paragraph 22)

**Recommendation 19.8** Identified and approved FR20 [infrastructure] projects are not subject to the 'exceptions, suspension' regime in order that agreed funding for the estate is spent as intended and not delayed. (Paragraph 25)

**Recommendation 19.9** That the three Services further promulgate the OH, rehabilitation, dental and mental health services in order to make Reservists fully aware of the medical services available to them. (Paragraph 27)

**Recommendation 19.10** That consideration is given to a means whereby Reservists submit some form of annual health declaration and/or have routine medicals linked to birthdays. (Paragraph 29)

## SUMMARY OF 2020 REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

**Recommendation 20.1** That all three Services develop and maintain Financial Incentives to recruit ex regulars, particularly for those trades and skills that are expensive to train and develop, acknowledging this is a cost effective method for manning the Reserve. (Paragraph 15)

**Recommendation 20.2** That the Reserve, through embedded part-time reserve staff posts should be involved in all aspects of the Whole Force:

- Across all Defence Lines of Development (DLOD) – particularly force design, and capability development.
- In the MOD (Secretariat Policy Operations (SPO)) – the MOD’s operations cell – Standing Joint Command (SJC) Headquarter (HQ) and Land Operations Centre (LOC).
- As operational staff of higher HQs. (Paragraph 19)

**Recommendation 20.3** That an assessment is made on the requirement for an uplift of personnel to meet the workload of managing a mobilisation and that additional personnel are mobilised to reinforce the RHQ of the mobilising unit, as enablers, before and throughout deployment. (Paragraph 21b(1))

**Recommendation 20.4** That the issue of the provision of REME support to equipment heavy units, whether for training or operations, is revisited as the current process does not appear to be working. (Paragraph 21b(2))

**Recommendation 20.5** That:

- The Services and the MOD review their plans for mobilisation so that it accommodates individuals as well as mobilising large numbers/units at short notice and rapidly.
- Reserve mobilisation expertise (staff posts with experience and expertise) is integrated into such areas as the SPO, SJC and LOC by creating embedded part-time reservist posts within those organisations.
- The process for pre-mobilisation medicals is reviewed and appropriate standards adopted for overseas and homeland operations.
- Revised processes are exercised routinely not only in units, but also the SPO, SJC and LOC. (Paragraph 25)

**Recommendation 20.6** That MOD considers reviewing the capacity of the RF&C staff branch in the MOD in order that it is manned adequately to meet the demands it is set. (Paragraph 28)

**Recommendation 20.7** That there is scope to consider developing a mobilisation package in support of those reservists deploying on shorter DAOTO, which is different to one that supports those on longer specific named operations or those that are more akin to warfighting. (Paragraph 29)

**Recommendation 20.8** That the requisite training courses are adapted through modularisation, distribution, concentration and remote/virtual learning, and are assessed and measured on this basis. (Paragraph 32)

**Recommendation 20.9** That the MOD urgently produces a transparent and agreed costing method across all three Services to compare the cost of regulars and reservists drawing on the Land Military Capability Output Costs (LEMCOG). (Paragraph 36)

**Recommendation 20.10** That:

- Any receipts raised through optimisation/rationalisation of the Volunteer Estate should be reinvested back into new estate or maintenance for the Volunteer Estate.
- When the Volunteer Estate Review reports, and if a programme of work is proposed or required, funding is identified and ring-fenced so that it is not subject to subsequent in-year budgetary pressures. (Paragraph 44)

**Recommendation 20.11** That Reservists submit an annual health declaration. (Paragraph 48)

**Recommendation 20.12** That, like the Royal Navy, the Army and Royal Air Force undertake periodic medicals for its reservists, linked to age/birthdays. (Paragraph 48)

**Recommendation 20.13** That such innovations [medical] required to facilitate the rapid mobilisation of the Reserve for Operation RESCRIPT are developed further, codified and adopted by all three Services. (Paragraph 50)



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## DEFENCE STATISTICS - RESERVE MANNING ACHIEVEMENT & TRENDS<sup>1</sup>

### Headline Figures

**Table 1.** Total and trained strength of the Future Reserves 2020 (FR20).

	2015 1 Apr	2016 1 Apr	2017 1 Apr	2018 1 Apr	2019 1 Apr	2020 1 Apr	2021 1 Apr	Change 2020/2021
<b>All Services</b>								
<b>Total strength</b>	30,810	34,760	36,220	36,260	36,400	37,010	37,410	+ 400
<b>Trained strength</b>	<b>24,630</b>	<b>27,270</b> II	<b>31,360</b>	<b>32,200</b>	<b>32,560</b>	<b>32,920</b>	<b>32,700</b>	<b>+ 220</b>
<b>Maritime Reserve</b>								
<b>Total strength</b>	3,160	3,540	3,560	3,600	3,850	3,870	4,080	+ 200
<b>Trained strength</b>	<b>1,980</b>	<b>2,350</b>	<b>2,560</b>	<b>2,760</b>	<b>2,830</b>	<b>2,870</b>	<b>2,870</b>	<b>- 10</b>
<b>Army Reserve</b>								
<b>Total strength</b>	25,440	28,670	29,940	29,710	29,470	29,930	30,030	+ 100
<b>Trained strength</b>	<b>21,030</b>	<b>23,030</b> II	<b>26,660</b>	<b>29,960</b>	<b>27,070</b>	<b>27,300</b>	<b>26,940</b>	<b>- 360</b>
<b>RAF Reserves</b>								
<b>Total strength</b>	2,220	2,540	2,730	2,950	3,080	3,200	3,300	+ 100
<b>Trained strength</b>	<b>1,620</b>	<b>1,890</b>	<b>2,150</b>	<b>2,480</b>	<b>2,660</b>	<b>2,740</b>	<b>2,890</b>	<b>+ 150</b>

Source: Defence Statistics (Tri-Service)


### Appendices:

1. Maritime Reserves
2. Army Reserves
3. RAF Reserves
4. Officer data
5. Accompanying notes to tables


1. Data is drawn from the Defence Statistics Report as at 1 Apr 2020.

# Maritime Reserve

Maritime Reserve Strength



Maritime Reserve Cumulative Financial Year to date Intake




**Note:**

**New Entrants** comprises of all intake into untrained strength. It includes new recruits, untrained ex-Regulars (either direct transfer or following a break in service), and untrained Reserve re-joiners (following a break in service or transferring from another Reserve Force)

**Trained Direct Entrants** comprises all intake into the trained strength and includes trained ex-Regulars (either direct transfers or following a break in service), and trained Reserve re-joiners following a break in service.

Maritime Reserve Quarterly Gains to Trained Strength and Trained Outflow




**Note:**


**Gains to trained strength** figures comprise personnel who complete Phase 2 training and personnel who enter directly onto the trained strength of the Maritime Reserve.

# Army Reserve

Army Reserve Strength



Army Reserve Cumulative Financial Year to date Intake




**Note:**

**New Entrants** comprises of all intake into untrained strength. It includes new recruits, untrained ex-Regulars (either direct transfer or following a break in service), and untrained Reserve re-joiners (following a break in service or transferring from another Reserve Force).

**Trained Direct Entrants** comprises all intake into the trained strength and includes trained ex-Regulars (either direct transfers or following a break in service), and trained Reserve re-joiners following a break in service.

Army Reserve Quarterly gains to Trained Strength and Trained Outflow




**Note:**

**Gains to trained strength** figures comprises personnel who complete Phase 1 (post-October 2016) training and personnel who enter directly onto the trained strength of the Army Reserve. Break in series represents the **change in definition of Army Trained Strength** in October 2016 from Phase 2 to Phase 1 trained. Gains to trained strength and outflow from trained strength data are unavailable for the month of September 2016 as a result.

# RAuxAF

RAF Reserve Strength




RAF Reserve cumulative financial year to date Intake



**Note:**

**New Entrants** comprises of all intake into untrained strength. It includes new recruits, untrained ex-Regulars (either direct transfer or following a break in service), and untrained Reserve re-joiners (following a break in service or transferring from another Reserve Force). **Trained Direct Entrants** comprises all intake into the trained strength and includes trained ex-Regulars (either direct transfers or following a break in service), and trained Reserve re-joiners following a break in service.

RAF Reserve monthly gains to Trained Strength and Trained Outflow



**Note:**

**Gains to trained strength** figures comprises personnel who complete Phase 2 training and personnel who enter directly onto the trained strength of the RAF Reserves.

## Officers

Table 2a Intake to and Outflow from Officers in the Maritime Reserve (Trained and Untrained)

	1 Apr 2015 to 31 Mar 2016	1 Apr 2016 to 31 Mar 2017	1 Apr 2017 to 31 Mar 2018	1 Apr 2018 to 31 Mar 2019	1 Apr 2019 to 31 Mar 2020	1 Apr 2020 to 31 Mar 2021
<b>Officers strength at start of period</b>	<b>900</b>	<b>1,040</b>	<b>1,120</b>	<b>1,160</b>	<b>1,230</b>	<b>1,250</b>
<b>Intake to Officers</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>100</b>
from another part of the Armed Forces of which	210	180	140	180	150	100
Rank to Officer in the Maritime Reserve	80	50	60	70	60	20
Regulars	80	100	70	90	70	50
University Service Units	10	10	~	~	10	10
No previous service	10	20	~	10	10	~
<b>Outflow from Officers</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>110 r</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>110</b>
to another part of the Armed Forces of which	20	20	20	20	40	30
Regulars	~	10	10	10	20	10
Left the Armed Forces	60	100	100	90	110	80
<b>Officers strength at end of period</b>	<b>1,040</b>	<b>1,120</b>	<b>1,160</b>	<b>1,230</b>	<b>1,250</b>	<b>1,240</b>

Source: Defence Statistics (Tri-Service)

Table 2b Intake to and Outflow from Officers in the Army Reserve (Trained and Untrained)

	1 Apr 2015 to 31 Mar 2016	1 Apr 2016 to 31 Mar 2017	1 Apr 2017 to 31 Mar 2018	1 Apr 2018 to 31 Mar 2019	1 Apr 2019 to 31 Mar 2020	1 Apr 2020 to 31 Mar 2021
<b>Officers strength at start of period</b>	<b>4,490</b>	<b>4,840</b>	<b>5,100</b>	<b>5,410</b>	<b>5,600</b>	<b>5,940</b>
<b>Intake to Officers</b>	<b>760</b>	<b>680</b>	<b>750</b>	<b>660</b>	<b>780</b>	<b>690</b>
from another part of the Armed Forces of which	640	600	670	600	700	620
Rank to Officer in the Army Reserve	100	100	120	120	160	150
Regulars	320	300	290	280	350	230
University Service Units	170	140	140	110	130	140
No previous service	110	90	80	60	80	80
<b>Outflow from Officers</b>	<b>400</b>	<b>430</b>	<b>440</b>	<b>480</b>	<b>440</b>	<b>550</b>
to another part of the Armed Forces of which	120	170	140	150	150	240
Regulars	70	100	80	90	90	130
Left the Armed Forces	280	260	300	330	290	310
<b>Officers strength at end of period</b>	<b>4,840</b>	<b>5,090</b>	<b>5,410</b>	<b>5,590</b>	<b>5,940</b>	<b>6,080</b>

Source: Defence Statistics (Tri-Service)

Table 2c Intake to and Outflow from Officers in the RAF Reserve (Trained and Untrained)

	1 Apr 2015 to 31 Mar 2016	1 Apr 2016 to 31 Mar 2017	1 Apr 2017 to 31 Mar 2018	1 Apr 2018 to 31 Mar 2019	1 Apr 2019 to 31 Mar 2020	1 Apr 2020 to 31 Mar 2021
<b>Officers strength at start of period</b>	<b>340</b>	<b>390</b>	<b>430</b>	<b>530</b>	<b>620</b>	<b>680</b>
<b>Intake to Officers</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>170</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>170</b>
from another part of the Armed Forces of which	90	80	150	130	130	160
Rank to Officer in the RAF Reserve	20	10	~	20	20	10
Regulars	60	60	110	80	90	120
University Service Units	-	~	-	-	-	~
No previous service	~	~	20	20	10	10
<b>Outflow from Officers</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>70 r</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>90</b>
to another part of the Armed Forces of which	20	10	40 r	30	20	40
Regulars	~	~	~	10	10	20
Left the Armed Forces	30	30	30	30	60	40
<b>Officers strength at end of period</b>	<b>340</b>	<b>430</b>	<b>530 r</b>	<b>620</b>	<b>680</b>	<b>760</b>

Source: Defence Statistics (Tri-Service)

## Accompanying Notes to Tables

1. Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) includes Volunteer Reserves who are mobilised, HRR and Volunteer Reserve personnel serving on ADC or FTRS contracts. Sponsored Reserves provide a more cost effective solution than Volunteer Reserves are also included in the Army Reserve FR20. Non Regular Permanent Staff (NRPS), Expeditionary Forces Institute (EFI) and University Officer Cadets and Regular Reservists are excluded.
2. Trained Strength comprises military personnel who have completed Phase 1 and 2 training for Maritime Reserve, the Army Reserve (prior to 1 October 2016) and the Royal Air Force Reserves. Following the change in definition of trained strength from 1 October 2016, trained strength for the Army Reserve comprises of personnel who have completed Phase 1 training.
3. Intake and outflow statistics are calculated from month-on-month comparisons of officer strength data. There has been a minor change in the methodology used to produce Reserves statistics from 1 April 2017. This now allows us to capture individuals who intake and outflow within the same month. For example, if an individual joins on 3 March and leaves on 29 March they are now counted as an intake and an outflow under the new methodology, whereas previously this would not have been identifiable. The net effect of this change on our Statistics is negligible and the figures above would not differ from that calculated previously by greater than ten personnel. This change does, however, improve both the accuracy and efficiency of our processes by, for example improving identification of those Officers who previously served in University Service Units.
4. Intake to the FR20 shows the most recent previous service recorded on JPA including those serving in another Reserve Service. Personnel may have had a break in service and may have served in more than one role. Intake from University Service Units figures just show that someone has been in a University Service Unit at some point in our data; they may not have moved straight into the FR20 directly after leaving. Only ex-Cadets are counted as an intake from University Service Units. Army Officers include Army Officer Cadets.
5. Outflow from the FR20 includes those personnel moving to another part of the Armed Forces within the calendar month. 'Left the Armed Forces' may include those who have a break in service before joining another part of the Armed Forces.
6. Intake and outflow from the Regular Forces includes transfers from/to another service.
7. University Service Units includes University Royal Navy Units (URNU), University Officer Training Corps (UOTC), University Air Squadrons (UAS) and Defence Technical Undergraduate Scheme (DTUS). Individuals counted ex-Cadets with a prior assignment type of one of these on the JPA system. Note that an individual does not have to have been serving in the University Service Unit associated with their future Reserve Service e.g. an individual may have joined the Army Reserve after serving in the URNU.

### Rounding


Figures have been rounded to the nearest 10, though numbers ending in '5' have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 20 to prevent systematic bias. Totals and subtotals have been rounded separately and may not equal the sum of their rounded parts.

### Symbols


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## RESERVIST MOBILISATION AND DEPLOYMENTS


### Maritime Reserve activity



### Army Reserve activity



### RAF Reserve activity



## EXTERNAL SCRUTINY 2021 REPORT - MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS

- 21.1** That the same intensity of focus and consistency that led to the success of Army regular recruiting is applied to the Reserve, particularly given that the reductions to regular strength increase the importance of having a fully manned Reserve.
- 21.2** That the Reserve, through embedded part-time reserve staff posts, should be involved in all aspects of the Whole Force across all Defence Lines of Development (DLOD) – particularly force design and capability development.
- 21.3** That the MOD produces a transparent and agreed costing method across all three Services and, in addition, a contingency fund is identified and ring-fenced to allow that use so that this almost perennial debate, or friction, does not arise.
- 21.4** If reservists are to be deployed on operations using RSDs more frequently and as a matter of policy, we recommend that the MOD reinvigorate the work to develop an appropriate package of support.
- 21.5** That RF30 takes forward work to simplify the TACOS available and guidelines, or policy (rules) for the appropriate TACOS to meet a given situation; i.e. RSDs for routine training; enhanced RSDs for short operational deployments (maximum 28 days) whether homeland resilience or DAOTO; and full mobilisation for longer deployments and more kinetic operations.
- 21.6** That Defence should be more forward leaning in making use of appropriate civilian courses and the recognition and accreditation of civilian qualifications, in lieu of military courses.

## SUMMARY OF PRIORITIES FOR 2021/22 WORK

In addition to the formal requirements set out in the Reserve Forces Act, the themes below will be examined during the 2021/22 reporting period.

### Policy Review

- Implementation of RF30 recommendations
- Tri-Service TACOS
- Integration of Maritime Reserve Directive
- Implementation of IR on Army Reserve units
- Project ASTRA

### Capability

- Employer Engagement
- Medical preparedness

### Manning, Recruiting, Retention

- Manning Target
- Recruiting and retention success
- Training policies – recognition of civilian qualifications

### Specific Visits

- Headquarters RN, Army, RAF and Strategic Command
- RFCA arranged visits in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Midlands
- Exercise PURPLE WARRIOR
- Exercise AGILE STANCE



## EXTERNAL SCRUTINY TEAM – MEMBERSHIP

**Chairman:**

Major General (Retd) S F N Lalor CB TD

**Members:**

Rear Admiral (Retd) C J Hockley CBE DL

Brigadier (Retd) P R Mixer OSTJ QVRM TD DL

Air Commodore (Retd) P E O'Neill CBE

Captain (Retd) I M Robinson OBE RD RNR

Colonel (Retd) G Straughan OBE TD

Professor G D Sheffield MA PhD FRHistS FRSA

**Clerk:**

Major General (Retd) J H Gordon CB CBE





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**[www.gov.uk/government/organisations/reserve-forces-and-cadets-associations](http://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/reserve-forces-and-cadets-associations)**